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On January 13, 1992, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
to a decision of the Fifth Circuit in Castillo v. Shell Oil Co.,' over the dissent
of Justice White.2 About two months later, the Court, without recorded
dissent, denied certiorari to a Third Circuit decision in Gumby v. General
Public Utilities Corp. Neither action was particularly extraordinary, for on
those two days the Court declined to review over 400 other cases while
granting review in sixteen Moreover, the Solicitor General opposed the
granting of review in Gwnby, an action highly correlated in the past with the
Court's denial of review.'
*Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A., Wright State University
(1978); J.D., Northwestern University (1981). I thank the University of Cincinnati College of
Law for financial support and Lisa Huelsman for her excellent research assistance. For their
comments on an earlier draft, I also thank Barry Friedman, Fred Longer, David Nelson, Robert
Martineau, Richard Myers, Richard Saphire, and Joseph Tomain, none of whom necessarily
agrees with my views.
1. 112 S. Ct. 914 (1992), denying cert. to In re Shell Oil, 932 F.2d 1518 (5th Cir. 1991).
2. Id.
3. 112 S. CL 1262 (1992), denying cert. to In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated 11, 940
F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991).
4. See 60 U.S.L.W. 3464 (Jan. 14, 1992) (summarizing orders of January 13, 1992); 60
U.S.L.W. 3593 (Mar. 3, 1992) (summarizing orders of March 2, 1992). Thus, on those days the
Court granted review in only four percent of the cases, about matching the number of petitions
granted in recent Terms. See 61 U.S.L.W. 3098 (Aug. 11, 1992) (compiling data from 1989,
1990, and 1991 Terms).
5. Brief for the United States in Opposition to the Certiorari Petition at 9-18, Gumby v.
General Pub. Utils. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992) (No. 91-676) [hereinafter Solicitor General's
Brief].
6. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SmmG IN THE UNITED STATES
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That the Supreme Court of necessity largely leaves law development to
the federal appellate courts, and state courts, is not particularly noteworthy.7
Such circumstances, however, make it important for students of federal
jurisdiction not to be fixated on Supreme Court decisions, to the exclusion of
lower court opinions. This article focuses on lower court interpretation of one
statute circumscribing the jurisdiction of the federal appellate courts. Section
1447(d) of the Judicial Code states that an order of a district court remanding
a case to a state court from which it was removed "is not reviewable on appeal
or otherwise."' Despite that seemingly clear language,9 the Supreme Court
in 1976 in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer° held that appellate
review of such an order was available when the district judge remanded for
reasons not authorized by Section 1447(c). Section 1447(c) generally provides
that cases improperly removed can be remanded."
Since most federal judges will, presumably, act lawfully when remanding
cases, post-Thermtron commentary has ritualistically characterizedthe decision
as a narrow or a very limited one. 2 But a review of the post-Thermtron era
in the lower federal courts belies that assertion. The Castillo and Gumby
cases, as well as many others, permit federal appellate review of district court
SUPREME COURT 137-38 (1991); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests
and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 83 AM. POL. SCI. Rv. 1109, 1121 (1988).
7. See generally SAMUEL ESTRICHm & JOHN E. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREM
COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988). The Section in full reads as follows:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be
reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
9. Indeed, some judges have characterized the language in § 1447(d) as "pellucid" (i.e.,
extremely clear). See, e.g., Hellon & Assoc., Inc. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 958 F.2d 295, 298
(9th Cir. 1992); Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 550, 556 (9th
Cir. 1991) (Noonan, J., dissenting); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1422 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); cf In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 700
(7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) ("'Straightforward' is about the last word judges attach to
§ 1447(d) these days, however.").
10. 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976).
11. The text of§ 1447(c) as it existed at the time of the Thermtrdn decision is found in note
40 infra. Section 1447(c) was amended in 1988, the significance of which is addressed infra Part
II.B.
12. E.g., Bregmanv. Alderman, 955 F.2d 660,662 (1 th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); In re TMI
Litigation Cases Consolidated 1, 940 F.2d 832, 841 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1262
(1992); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1826 (3d ed. 1988); HowARD P. FINK & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 525 (2d ed. 1987); 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHr ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3740 (1985); Charles Rothfield, Rationalizing Removal,
1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 242; Robert T. Markowski, Comment, Remand Order Review After
Thermtron Products, 1977 U. ILL. L. REv. 1086, 1104.
[Vol. 58
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remand orders in a wide variety of circumstances. The evisceration of the bar
of Section 1447(d) initiated by Thermtron continues to have an impressive and
largely unreviewed ripple effect in the doctrine of lower federal courts.
Nor is this doctrine a mere academic curio. In recent years, about eleven
percent of the total civil docket of federal district courts consist of cases
removed from state court to federal court, on grounds of the existence of
diversity or federal question jurisdiction. 3 The numbers are large enough
to prompt recent calls for restricting or eliminating the right to so remove. 4
Of the total number removed, about fifteen percent are then remanded back
to the state court-a total of about 3000 cases each year. 5 The decreasing
scope of the Section 1447(d) bar makes a significant percentage of the latter
subject to federal appellate review.
This Article critiques this largely unnoticed expansion of federal appellate
jurisdiction. Part I of the Article focuses on the Thermtron case. The initial
portion of Part I reviews the tortured history of Section 1447(d). Part I then
examines the Thermtron opinion, and considers whether the case would likely
be decided in the same way today, given the renewed focus on legislative text
(as opposed to other interpretative sources) by the Supreme Court.
Part II of the Article considers both doctrinal and statutory developments
in the wake of Thermtron. First, Part II reviews what little the Court has said
about Thermtron since 1976. The second section of Part II examines a 1988
amendment to Section 1447(c), and considers what significance that
amendment does or should have for the continued viability of the Thermtron
interpretation of Section 1447(d). The third and final section of Part II
surveys and subjects to critical comment the lower court decisions, such as
Castillo and Gumby, which have considerably and simultaneously expanded
Thermtron and contracted Section 1447(d).
Part III of the Article takes a step back from doctrine and suggests if and
how, ideally, federal appellate courts should review remand decisions. While
the previous portions of the Article were largely critical of Thermtron and its
progeny, Part III demonstrates that the results of many of those cases were
sound. That is, there should be appellate review available over such orders,
13. See 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF TE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TIE
UNITED STATES COuRTS 79 (compiling data from 1980 through 1990).
14, E.g., FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY CoMMrrrEo, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY
COMMrrEE 43-44 (Apr. 2, 1990) (recommending that the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988), should be amended to forbid removal
from state to federal court in cases in which the amount in controversy is less than $10,000)
[hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS REPORT].
15. See Jerome I. Braun, Reviewability of Remand Orders: Striking the Balance in Favor
of Equality Rather than Judicial Expediency, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 79, 89 (1990); Neal
Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 392 (1992).
1993]
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but a more principled basis to accomplish that end is available: amend the
relevant statutes, rather than torture their language via doctrinal interpretation.
Part III considers several avenues a reform effort can take. Finally, the
Article concludes by placing the review of Thermtron and its progeny in the
larger context of federal courts scholarship.
II. DECONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING THERMTRON
A. A Short History of Section 1447(d)
Though removal is not mentioned in the Constitution, since the Judiciary
Act of 1789, Congress has statutorily provided for the removal of certain types
of cases from state to federal court. The history of removal jurisdiction is
found elsewhere 16 and need not be recounted in depth here, other than for its
relevance to remand orders and to appellate review of these orders. The 1789
Act did not forbid appellate review (at the time, directly to the Supreme
Court), but the Court held that remand decisions were not "final orders"
subject to appeal, and could only be reviewed by a writ of mandamus. 7
Legislation in 1875 considerably revised removal to and remand from the
federal courts. Substantively, the legislation permitted removal of virtually all
16. Useful summaries ofthe development ofremovaljurisdction and remand procedure can
be found in CHARLES A. WRiGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs 219-37 (4th ed. 1983); BATOR ET
AL., supra note 12, at 33, 481-84, 1767-69; Markowski, supra note 12, at 1088-94. Historically,
passage of the removal statutes appears to have been largely motivated by the perceived need for
a federal forum (in the face of a hostile state forum) for at least certain types of cases. BATOR
ET AL., supra note 12, at 1767; Markowski, supra note 12, at 1088-89. This motivation seems
virtually identical forthe rationales underlying original federal question and diversity jurisdiction.
17. Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 507 (1875); Knickerbocker Ins.
Co. of Chicago v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 258 (1873).
Although the brevity of analysis in these decisions has been properly criticized, see 15A
CHARLES A. WRiGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.11 at 701 n.13
(1992), they still are regarded as good law today, despite the considerable intervening statutory
and doctrinal developments. Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 353
(1976); In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook,
J.); WRIGHT ET AL., supra, at 696. A good case can be made that under modem principles of
finality jurisprudence, a remand in this context is a final order, since while it does not terminate
the case (which lives on in state court), it ends it in federal court. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1983); WRIGHT ET AL., supra, at 702; Joan
Steinman, Postremoval Changes in the Party Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the
New Law, and Rule 19, 38 KAN. L. REV. 863, 953 n.341 (1990). Of course, if§ 1447(d) were
read to bar all review of remand decisions, this distinction makes little difference. But once
§ 1447(d) is interpreted (or amended) to permit at least some appellate review of remand
decisions, the issue of finality does assume significance. The reason is that a final decision,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), is subject to plenary appellate review. In contrast, a non-final
order can usually only be reviewed by a writ of mandamus, which is regarded as a far narrower
type of appellate review. See infra Part I.B.
(Vol. 58
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actions that would be within the original jurisdiction of federal district
courts.' The provisions remain largely intact today.' Procedurally,
remands to state court were authorized in cases involving collusive or
improper joinder of parties, or when the district court lacked "jurisdiction.''20
Finally, the statute provided for direct appellate review, apparently overruling
the precedent holding remand decisions not to be final orders.2 Twelve
years later, Congress restricted the scope of removal jurisdiction in a number
of ways.' For our purposes, the most pertinent restriction was a repeal of
the appellate review provision of the 1875 Act, and its replacement by
language forbidding review by "appeal or writ of error."'
The Congressional purpose for the change is obscure. At the time, there
was great concern over the burgeoning caseloads of federal courts (sound
familiar?), and the 1887 law (as well as other contemporary legislation)
restricted access to federal courts. 24 Thus, the appellate restriction can be
seen as an effort to lessen the caseload of the Supreme Court, during an era
when intermediate federal courts of appeals were unavailable.' Modem
cases, however, seem to have added other rationales for the change. It is now
18. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470. The same act in § I also provided for
original jurisdiction in district courts of federal question cases. This provision is the predecessor
of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
19. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (1988).
20. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 stat. 472.
21. IR. Section 5 provided in part that the order of the district court (then called the circuit
court) remanding a case "shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal,
as the case may be." Id.
22. For example, the 1887 Act restricted removal to defendants. See BATOR Er AL., supra
note 12, at 1768.
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552. This provision read as follows:
Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any circuit court of
the United States, and the circuit court shall decide that the cause was improperly
removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came,
such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of
error from the decision of the circuit court so remanding such cause shall be
allowed.
24. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U.S. 556, 583 (1896); BATOR Er AL., supra note
12, at 38; FELix FRANKFURTER & JAMEs M. LANDIS, THm BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A STUDY IN THE FEDEAL JUDICIAL SYsTEM 93-96 (1928).
Frankfurter and Landis also point out that there was pressure from southern members of
Congress to limit the considerable original and removal jurisdiction granted federal courts in
1875. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra, at 85-93.
25. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 24, at 86; Markowski, supra note 12, at 1112.
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usually said that the 1887 amendment was intended to "prevent delay in the
trial of remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues."2 6
The prohibition on appellate review took a bumpy road to arrive at its
present codification in Section 1447(d). The limit was embodied in sections
71 and 80 of the Judicial Code of 1911,27 inadvertently left out during
recodification in 1948," and reinstated in substantially its present form in
1949.29 During this period, a number of Court decisions construed the
various codifications and seemed to read the prohibition on review fairly
26. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351. For similar statements, see United States v. Rice, 327 U.S.
742, 751 (1946). For acknowledgments of the shift in rationales for the bar on review, see Joan
Steinman, Removal, Remand, andReview in Pendent Claim andPendent Party Cases, 41 VAND.
L. REv. 923, 997 (1988); Project, Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory
Restatement, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1984, at 13, 109.; see also infra Part III.A.
(discussing additional modem rationales for bar on review).
27. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, §§ 28, 37, 36 Stat. 1094, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 71,
80 (1946). Section 71 read:
Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any district court
of the United States, and the district court shall decide that the cause was improperly
removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came,
such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of
error from the decision of the district court so remanding such cause shall be
allowed.
Section 80 read:
If in any suit commenced in a district court, or removed from a State court to a
district court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said
district court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that
such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly
within the jurisdiction of said district court, or that the parties to said suit have been
improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the
purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this chapter, the said
district court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand
it to the court from which it was removed, as justice may require, and shall make
such order as to costs as shall be just.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1948).
29. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 102. Under the 1948 revision, there was
apparently "no intent to change the prior law substantively, although the prohibition of appellate
review of remand orders contained in § 71 of the old Code was inexplicably omitted."
Thermtron,423 U.S. at350n.15. The House Report on the 1949 amendments stated that: 'This
section strikes out subsections (c) and (d) of section 1447 of title 28, U.S.C., as covered by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and adds a new subsection to Section 1447 to remove any
doubt that the former law as to the finality of an order of remand to a State court is continued."
H.R. REP. No. 352,81st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248, 1268.
According to the Thermtron majority, "[t]he plain intent of Congress, which was accomplished
with the 1949 amendment, was to recodify the pre-1948 law without material change insofar as
the provisions of §§ 71 and 80 of the old Code here relevant were concerned." Thermtron, 423
U.S. at 350 n.15.
(Vol. 58
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expansively." The textual evolution of Section 1447(d) came to an end in
1964, when the Civil Rights Act of that year permitted review of remands of
cases removed pursuant to Section 1443."' The latter change was influenced
by a perception that remands of civil rights cases were particularly injurious
to defendants in those cases, and that appellate exposition of Section 1443 was
necessary.32
30. E.g., United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742 (1946) (1911 Act applies to all removed cases,
even those removed under a law passed in 1926 concerning removal by the United States of an
action involving Indian lands in state court); Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S.
374 (1937) (under 1911 Act, §§ 71 and 80 were to be construed in pari materia, so prohibition
of review in § 71 was applicable to an order of remand made pursuant to § 80); Ex parte
Matthew Addy S.S., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) (same with respect to 1911 Act); In re Pennsylvania
Co., 137 U.S. 451 (1890) (prohibition of 1887 Act includes a writ of mandamus); Morey v.
Lockhart, 123 U.S. 56,58 (1887) ('Its language is broad enough to cover all cases, and such was
evidently the purpose of Congress.").
Mark Herrmann prefers to read these cases as having broad dicta but narrow holdings.
Mark Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: When and How Federal Trial CourtRemand Orders are
Reviewable, 19 ARz ST. LJ. 395, 398-401 (1987). In these cases, he argues, the remanding
district courts held that they lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus it was dicta for the
Supreme Court to hold that the statutory bar on review extended to all cases-even those where
the district court remanded for a reason other than subject matter jurisdiction. His reading
arguably supports the Thermtron majority's analysis, considered infra. Herrmann's interpretation
of these cases is not totally implausible, but his reading is somewhat beside the point. The pre-
Thermtron cases did indeed view the prohibition broadly, and it is by no means clear that the
supposedly limited nature of the reasons for remand, had the Court thought more about it, would
have changed the wording of the opinions. Nor did the majority opinion in Thermtron adopt
Herrmann's interpretation of the cases (though it did not reject it, either).
31. Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 901, 78 Stat. 266. Title
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1988) permits removal of certain civil rights cases from state to federal court,
i.e., of civil actions or criminal prosecutions where a person is being denied "equal rights"
provided by federal law. The potentially broad scope of§ 1443 has been considerably narrowed
by Supreme Court opinions. E.g., Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) (interpreted language
of § 1443(1) to require that federal law providing for the "equal civil rights" must concern
specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality; First and Fourteenth Amendments not
covered, but public accommodations provisions of 1964 Civil Rights Act were); City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) (interpreted § 1443(2) to permit removal only by
federal officers and those assisting such officers); see generally BATOR Er AL., supra note 12,
at 1067-71.
32. A good review of the legislative history of the civil rights exception to § 1447(d)
appears in Markowski, supra note 12, at 1095-97.
19931
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B. Thermtron
Other than the civil rights exception, found in the statute itself, it seemed
to be the accepted view that Section 1447(d) barred review of any remand
order, no matter what rationale the order was based upon.3 That accepted
view was considerably modified by the Supreme Court's decision in 1976 in
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdofer.34
In Thermtron, plaintiffs had filed a tort action in the state court of
Kentucky, and defendants removed it on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
Almost a year later, District Judge Hermansdorfer sua sponte remanded the
case to state court. He conceded that defendant had properly removed the
case as a diversity action3 What he did not concede was that he was
powerless to remand under these circumstances. The right to remove, the
judge said, must be "balanced" against plaintiffs' rights to choose their forum
and to a speedy decision on the merits.36 Given the crowded docket of his
court and lack of available trial time (sound familiar, again?), coupled with the
lack of local prejudice demonstrated by the defendant (the original purpose of
removal), the judge held that a remand to state court was appropriate. 7
Defendants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Sixth Circuit, which
denied the petition on the basis that it had no jurisdiction to review the order
under Section 1447(d).3"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. In an opinion by
Justice White, the Court said that two questions were presented: whether a
remand of a properly removed diversity case could be based on reasons not
authorized by statute and, if not, whether such an order could be reviewed by
a writ of mandamus. 9 The majority had little trouble with the first question.
In 1976, Section 1447(c) of the Judicial Code (the descendant of Section 80
of the 1911 Code) stated that a district "shall remand the case" if it was
"removed improvidently and without jurisdiction."4 According to the Court,
1
33. See, e.g., In re Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVIsION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL CouRTs 417 (1969) [hereinafter ALI Study]; PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 1324 (2d ed. 1973); Herrmann,
supra note 30, at 405 & n.48.
34. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
35. Id at 340.
36. Id
37. Id at 340-41. In this order of remand, the court documented the docket pressures under
which the judge was operating. Id. at 340 n.3. He had also entered similar orders of remand
in other diversity cases on his docket. Id. at 341 n.4.
38. Id. at 341-42.
39. Id at 337.
40. Section 1447(c) provided: 'If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case
was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and
[Vol. 58
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it was "unquestioned" that Section 1447(d) prohibited review of a remand
order made pursuant to section 1447(c) "whether erroneous or not. 141 Here,
the Court concluded, the remand was not authorized by Section 1447(c), since
the district judge did not purport to rely on it and since caseload consider-
ations are irrelevant to the right to remove.42
Nor did the majority have much trouble with its second question,
concerning whether a writ of mandamus could issue. The district judge's lack
of authority to remand proved crucial in distinguishing the seemingly absolute
bar of appellate review contained in Section 1447(d). Subsections (c) and (d)
must be construed together (i.e., in pari materia), meaning "that only remand
orders issued under Section 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified
therein-that removal was improvident and without jurisdiction-are immune
from review under § 1447(d)."43
This interpretation, the Court found, was supported by a review of the
history of the numerous recodifications of what is now subsection (d) between
1887 and 1949. In particular, the Court focused on statutory language in the
1887 and 1911 Acts. That language, the Court said, confirmed that the review
bar assumed an "improperly" removed case-that is, one remanded because
it was not removed properly or with an insufficient jurisdictional base in
federal court.' Finding that Congress did not intend to give district judges
"carte blanche authority" to remand cases on grounds not found in the
statute,45 the Court "decline[d] to construe § 1447(d) so woodenly as to"
forbid appellate review in such circumstances." With these predicates, the
Court held that a writ of mandamus was an appropriate vehicle of appellate
review. Recognizing the old rule that remand orders were not final decisions
subject to appeal,47 the Court held a writ of mandamus to be the proper mode
of review.'
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart,
dissented.49 According to Justice Rehnquist, the only question in the case
was whether the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to consider the writ of
may order the payment of just costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
41. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343.
42. Id. at 343-45.
43. IM at 345-46. The Court relied on Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S.
374 (1937) for the invocation of the in pari materia canon of statutory construction in this
context. See supra note 30 (summarizing holding in Bryant).
44. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 347-51.
45. Id at 351.
46. Id at 352.
47. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 352-53.
49. Justice Stevens did not participate in the case. Id. at 353.
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mandamus. If that were so, then the propriety of the remand order was
irrelevant." The dissent construed Section 1447(d) to be clear-a complete
bar to any appellate consideration of a remand order.5 Acknowledging that
the district judge may have erred in ordering a remand, Justice Rehnquist
nonetheless found that to permit review would contravene Congress' desire to
prevent delay and interference with state court litigation.52 It did not matter
that the remand was not predicated on Section 1447(c), for the district judge's
disposition here was the same as when a judge erroneously applies the criteria
of subsection (c). Yet the majority found the former to be reviewable and the
latter not.53
Justice Rehnquist found the majority's in pari materia construction of
subsections (c) and (d) unconvincing. It is true, the dissent conceded, that the
review bar in the 1911 Code (section 71) states that it applies to a district
court "so remanding" an "improperly removed" case.54 But, according to
Justice Rehnquist, cases interpreting the 1887 and 1911 codes found the bar
to apply to all remands.5" At any rate, the "so remanding" language is not
found in current Section 1447(d), and the dissent was less sure than the
majority that the 1948 and 1949 Judicial Codes simply reenacted the prior
law.56 To the extent that they did, the dissent contended that the prior law
barred review of any and all remand orders.5 Finally, the dissent noted that,
in Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress had shown it could
50. Id. at 353-54 (Rebnquist, J., dissenting).
51. Id at 354 (§ 1447(d) "means what it says"); id. at 355 (Congress meant "what it so
plainly said."); i d ("plain language" of§ 1447(d)); id at 357 ("Congress' express, and heretofore
fully effective, directive"); id. at 360 ("express directive of Congress").
52. Id. at 354-55.
53. Id. at 356. Justice Rehnquist also found the distinction "unworkable" since it would
seem to require that district judges issue explanations for their decisions, or would encourage
them to simply cite subsection (c), even if "such a conclusion [were] absurd." Id. at 357; cf In
re Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (granting mandamus to
require district judge to state reasons for remand); In re Decorator Indus., Inc,, 980 F.2d 1371,
1373 (1lth Cir. 1992) (assuming that district court relied on § 1447 (c) despite lack of citation
to that Section in district court's opinion).
54. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 358 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. I d at 358-59. Justice Rehnquist cited and discussed Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U.S. 56
(1887) and Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374 (1937).
56. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 359-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Here, the dissent quoted
legislative history from the 1948 Code that new § 1447 "consolidates procedural provisions of
sections 71, 72, 74, 76, 80, 81 and 83 of title 28, U.S.C. 1940 ed., with important changes in
substance and phraseology." Id at 360 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A-136
(1948)). The majority, in contrast, cited legislative history from the 1949 Amendment.
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 349 n.15; see supra note 29 (quoting latter history).
57. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 360.
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statutorily "protect against judicial abuses of removal rights,"' and the Court
should not write another exception into the statute.
C. Thermtron Revisited
Thermtron was subject to extensive commentary, almost all of it critical
and in agreement with the dissent59 Instead of reviewing these arguments,
it would be more useful to reexamine Thermtron in light of the extensive
Supreme Court and scholarly discussion of statutory interpretation since 1976.
That enterprise will not only provide a firmer basis upon which to draw
conclusions about the correctness of the decision, but will permit a more lucid
analysis of the post-Thermtron statutory and doctrinal developments.
1. Thermtron and the New Textualism
When Thermtron was decided, the Supreme Court in statutory construc-
tion cases seemed to follow an eclectic approach, emphasizing to varying
degrees the purported plain meaning of the text, legislative history, the overall
purpose of the statute, and other factors. 6 In the past decade, however,
numerous decisions of the Court have with varying degrees of explicitness
rejected that approach, emphasizing the interpretation of the statutory text to
the apparent exclusion of other interpretative sources.6  The new
58. Id at 361.
59. For critical reaction, see BATOR ET AL., supra note 12, at 1826; DAvID P. CURRIE,
FEDERAL CouRTs 594 n.3 (4th ed. 1990); Joseph T. Carruthers, Note, Civil Procedure-Review
of Renewal Orders Issues on Grounds Outside The Remand Statute, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1031 (1976); Tony M. Graham, Note, Federal Courts-OrderRemanding Case for Reasons Not
Recognized by Statute Reviewable by Written Mandamus: Thermtron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 12 TULSA L.. 194 (1976); C. Lee, Note, Federal Courts-Removal-Writ of
Mandamus Authorized to Review Non-Statutory Remand Order-Thermtron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 10 CREiGHToN L. REV. 521, 534-38 (1977). More sympathetic reaction can be
found in Hermann, supra note 30, at 405-12, and Markowski, supra note 12.
60. Generalizations like this one are hazardous to make, since the Court's jurisprudence in
the 1960's and 1970's in this regard seems to defy categorization. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDmGE,
JR. & PHILIP P. FPJCKEY, CASES AND MATERIA S ON LEGisLATION. STATUTES AND THE
CREATON OF PUBLIC POLICY 591-95 (1988) (reviewing and discussing numerous examples from
the period in question); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.. 331, 347 n.38 (1991) (noting difficulty of identifying
Court's primary reasoning in statutory interpretation cases, in empirical study of decisions from
1967 to 1990 overridden by Congress). Nonetheless, there appears to be sufficient empirical data
to support the characterization of the Court's jurisprudence made in the text. See Note, Intent,
Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95
HARv. L. REv. 892 (1982) (discussing numerous examples and finding shift from broad approach
of 1950's to mid-1970's to more textual approach from that time to the present).
61. Oft-cited examples are West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct.
19931
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textualism62 is not necessarily a myopic focus on one word or phrase in a
statute. Rather, it takes the entire statutory text as its starting and ending
points for interpretation. In between those points, however, the new
textualism also considers evolution of and changes in the text,63 the language
and structure of the statute as a whole,' and utilizes long-standing canons
of statutory construction. 5
How does the result in Thermtron fare under the new textualism? In my
view, not very well. At first blush, the conclusion may seem dubious, since
both the majority and dissenting opinions spend considerable time on the
statutory text, the evolution of the statutory text, and the structure of Section
1447(c)-(d). Though the majority, in part, ostensibly utilized the tools of the
new textualism, that alone does not mean that the majority opinion can be
wrapped in the imprimatur of textual analysis.
The majority opinion relied on two principal textual bases to overcome
the seemingly absolute bar to review found in subsection (d). First, Justice
White took the reader through the changes to the various predecessor statutes
of Section 1447. He concluded that these changes meant that Congress only
intended to bar review of remands made pursuant to reasons found in the
statute (i.e., subsection (c) and its predecessors).' The conclusion he drew
from this textual evolution is problematic. As the dissent observed, none of
the prior cases which considered these changes spoke of subsection (d), or its
predecessors so narrowly, and in any event the operative language from the
1138, 1143 (1991); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. Ct. 599, 604 (1991); United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989). From the 1991 Term, one could also cite
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992); Patterson v. Shumate,
112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (1992); Morales v. TWA, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2036-37 (1992);
ConnecticutNational Bankv. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). For an excellent summary
and critique of the recent cases emphasizing sole resort to the text, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
62. I borrow the term from Professor Eskridge. See Eskridge, supra note 61.
63. E.g., United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1334 (1992).
64. E.g., Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2382 (1992);
United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633-40 (1992); United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2107 (1992); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S.
152, 158 (1990).
65. E.g., United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. CL at 1633 (presumes Congressio-
nal familiarity with long-standing rules of statutory construction); Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 112 S. CL 2160, 2165 (1992) (presumes that when statutes use a term of art,
Congress intended it to have its established meaning); Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry.
Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 564-66 (1991) (reiterating rule that Congress must in certain situations
provide clear statement that it intended to impose obligations on state governments); see also
Thompson/CenterArms Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2110 (rule of lenity presumption applies once Court
determines statute is ambiguous).
66. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 345-52.
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1911 Judicial Code disappeared in the recodification in 1948 and 1949.6 So,
at best, the conclusion to be drawn from textual evolution alone is ambiguous.
Justice White stood on firmer ground when invoking the in pari materia
canon of statutory construction-that is, reading the statute as a whole. Based
in part on textual evolution and prior case law, the majority held that
subsection (d) could only be read in light of the immediately proceeding
subsection. This meant that the bar of review was only intended to apply to
the types of remands authorized by Congress (i.e., those mentioned in
subsection (c)). But for several reasons, this conclusion is also unconvincing.
First, the in pari materia canon has come under recent attack. The
canon seems to assume that when drafting statutes, Congress is aware of and
takes into account the provisions of the entire statute, whether the latter are
undergoing revision or not. These assumptions are dubious, since drafters
may not be taking such an omnibus approach, particularly if only one part of
a multi-part section is being revised. It may be more accidental than not that
certain subsections end up codified together in the United States Code.69 The
canon may be appropriate if standard interpretative guides, like the text itself
or legislative history, make plain that sections are to be read together. But to
determine that makes the utility of a canon suspect in the first instance.
Second, even accepting the notion of an in pari materia rule, it does little
to aid the Thermtron majority. Between the codifications in 1948 and 1949
and the Thermtron decision, Congress had demonstrated that it was aware of
the bar to review in Section 1447(d) and could legislate an exception. This
was, of course, Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which in subsection (d)
itself specifically exempted cases removed under Section 1443.70 Likewise,
67. Id. at 357-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. It is worth noting that virtually all the traditional canons of statutory construction
(including many not mentioned in this Article) have come under attack for various reasons, for
example that they are based on dubious policy rationales, premised on unrealistic assumptions
about the legislative process, or are in opposition to other canons of construction. See ESKRIDGE
& FRICKEY, supra note 60, at 689-95; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIs AND
REFoRM 276-86 (1985). As an example of the last criticism, the inpari materia canon used in
Thermtron is opposed by the rule that the canon is not applicable if the scope and aim of the two
provisions are distinct. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 60, at 690. Interestingly, the latter
exception was adopted by the three dissenting justices in United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742,
753-55 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 1926 statute exempted the United States
in certain types of cases from the bar of review in § 71 of the 1911 Judicial Code).
69. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 60, at 653-54; POSNER, supra note 68, at 281.
As an apt example, consider the 1988 amendment to § 1447(c), the legislative history of
which makes not even an allusion to subsection (d) or the Thermtron case. See infra Part ll.B.
70. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, one of the proponents of the amendment argued that "improper remands were
more likely to occur in civil rights actions." Markowski, supra note 12, at 1097 (citing 110
Cong. Ree. 2784 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Edwards)). This suggests that the speaker thought all
remands, even improper ones, were barred by pre-amendment § 1447(d). On the other hand, it
1993]
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post-Thermtron, Congress in 1989 in the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIFRE)7" specifically provided that in cases
removed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from state court,
remand orders could be reviewed by federal appeals courts.72 Apparently,
this action was taken in part on the understanding that if no such provision
were enacted, Section 1447(d) would bar review of remand orders.73 Thus,
in two special instances, Congress proved to be aware of and able to legislate
around the review bar, which suggests (indirectly, at least) that Section
1447(d) is considered somewhat sepaate, operating with force notwithstanding
other statutory provisions.74
Another favorite tool of textual exegesis is the use of presumptions of
statutory construction.75 While neither opinion in Thermtron expressly relied
upon such presumptions,76 they arguably are a source of support for the
is not clear whether the speaker meant to confine "improper" to remands incorrectly applying the
criteria of § 1447(c), which presumably applies since § 1443 makes no mention of remands.
Probably the speaker never thought of the distinction. Maybe no one else did either. See supra
note 33 and accompanying text.
71. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
72. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(l)(3), 1819(b)(2)(C) (Supp. M 1991).
73. The massive legislative history of FIFRE (excerpts of which take up over 400 pages in
U.S.C.C.A.N. alone), apparently makes only fleeting reference to the remand provision. H.R.
REP. No. 54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 328-29 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 124-
25. However, courts have inferred that the provisions were intended to overcome the usual bar
to review found in § 1447(d). See In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
bane) (discussing § 1819(b)(2)(C)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 967 (1993); Maniar v. FDIC, 979
F.2d 782, 784 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); Hellon & Assoc., Inc. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 958
F.2d 295,297-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing § 1441a(l)(3)). ButseelnreTMILiigation Cases
Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 832, 848 n.10 (3d Cir. 1991) (discounting significance of Congress
making exceptions to § 1447(d) in 1989, for purposes of determining scope of The rmtron), ccrt.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992).
74. See also Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, Note, CIVIL PROCEDUEm-FEDERAL-28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(D) BARS REVIEW OF ORDERS REMANDING TO STATE COURT ONLY WHEN REASON FOR
REMAND IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFEcT-Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 2 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 541, 550-52 (1976) (arguing that majority in Thermiron stretched applicability of l4parl
materia rule).
75. See generally ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 60, at 655; Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 451-62 (1989);
Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529
(1992).
76. Both opinions briefly alluded to the canon that no "changes of law or policy are to be
presumed from changes of language in the [1948] revision [of the Judicial Code] unless an intent
to make such changes is clearly expressed." Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 350 n.15 (quoting Fourco
Glass Co.v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222,227 (1957)) (majority opinion). The dissent
initially expressed uncertainty whether this canon made sense, but argued that even if it did in
general, it did not aid the majority here, since (as the dissent read it) the pre-1948 Code as
interpreted barred all review of remand orders. Id. at 359-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For
more recent invocations of this canon, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213
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holding in the case. One relevant presumption could be the canon that
removal statutes are to be construed narrowly." But this presumption does
little to add to the majority's analysis. The presumption is intended to reflect
Congress' desire to limit the number of cases removed.78 Yet permitting
review of district court orders to remand such cases increases the chances that
more removed cases will stay in federal court.79 One writer has also argued
in favor of Thermtron on the basis that there should be a presumption in favor
of appellate review." Such a canon might indeed have aided the Thermtron
majority, but it is doubtful that any such presumption exists in this context.
There appears to be a presumption of review by Article III judges of certain
administrative action,8 but the dissent's interpretation of Section 1447(d)
does permit review of the remand motion by an Article III judge-namely, the
district court.
It may well be that textualism fails in hard cases.82 But purely within
the textualist framework, Thermtron does not seem a particularly hard case.
For good or ill, a plain reading of Section 1447(d) bars appellate review of all
remand orders, and applying traditional tools of textual analysis should not
change that result.
(1992); Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989). Cf Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2217
n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism that this principle would "affirmatively
authorize an inference that Congress' recodification was designed to approve of prior
constructions of the [diversity] statute."). This canon does little to advance analysis, of course,
when there is disagreement over the scope of prior interpretations. See id. at 2220 (canon should
be limited to "explicit" holdings of pre-1948 cases).
77. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). The presumption
was based on the understanding that Congress since the 1887 Act has consistently sought to
restrict removal. Id. It may also be a corollary of the narrow construction typically given to
grants of jurisdiction, see Steinman, supra note 26, at 936, or derived from respect for the
operation of state governments and state courts. Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc., 932 F.2d
1043, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1991).
78. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108.
79. Cf Steinman, supra note 26, at 936-37 (skeptical of the rationale for this canon, given
general correlation of removal jurisdiction with original district court jurisdiction).
80. Herrmann, supranote 30, at 414. The writer referred to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and a federal
practice treatise as sources for the presumption. Id.
81. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888, 898 (1991); Block v.
Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1982); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,
603 (1988) (constiiutional claims); Joseph L. Faber, Note, Law's Politic: Webster v. Doe and
Judicial Review ofAgency Decisions Affecting the Constitutional Rights of Individuals, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 819, 844-45 (1991); see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593, 601-02 (1992); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in
Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1992).
82. ESK IDGE & FRicKEY, supra note 60, at 571.
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2. Thermtron and Practical Reasoning
Despite the considerable attention afforded textual analysis by the
Supreme Court, many (perhaps most) Court cases are willing to go beyond the
text of the statute to consider legislative history or purpose.83 Descriptively,
it seems fair to say that most statutory construction cases are not animated by
grand theory but by practical reasoning, which considers text, legislative
history and purpose, and evolutive evidence according to the strength of each
and the facts of the particular case."4
In retrospect, Thermtron is one of those cases and the result can be better
justified as one of practical reasoning rather than strict textual analysis.
Indeed, many jurisdictional statutes akin to Section 1447(d) have long been
interpreted by sources beyond the text. At the trial court level, interpretations
of the diversity 5 or federal question86 statutes have not proceeded on strict
83. E.g., Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 113 S. Ct. 716, 726 n.12 (1993); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992); United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867,
1870 (1992); United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1334 (1992); Union Bankv. Wolas, 112
S. Ct. 527, 529 (1991); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476,2484 n.4 (1991);
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990); see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore
M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 687,
700-01 (1992) ("despite frequent invocations of the "plain meaning" canon, in none of these
cases does the Court rely on plain meaning in the face of statutory purposes that point in an
opposite direction."); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunction
of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 231, 242-46 (plain meaning is primary f9cus but Court
will consider other interpretative sources when it is subject to dispute); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The
Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073,
1119-20 (1992) (review of sample of Supreme Court statutory decisions from 29 Terms from
1890 to 1990 indicates, inter alia, that most cases explicitly or implicitly use a dynamic
approach); Note, hyLearnedHand Would Never ConsultLegislative History Today, 105 HARv.
L. REv. 1005, 1006 (1992) (other than Justice Scalia, most Justices do not purport to follow
strict textualism in statutory construction).
84. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 322-23 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability
of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule ofLaw, 45 VAMD. L. REv. 533 (1992).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988); see, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2208
(1992) (reading domestic relations exception into § 1332 in some cases, despite lack of textual
basis); Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990) (§ 1332 traditionally read to require
complete diversity of citizenship despite lack of textual basis for requirement).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988); see, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (determining that what "arises under" federal law for purposes of
§ 1331 requires "sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal
system"); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 2 (1983)
(well-pleaded complaint rule applies to removed cases); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley,
211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (imposing well-pleaded complaint rule despite lack of textual basis);
cf American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2466-67 (1992) (relying on text and
legislative history to hold that statute permitting Red Cross to "sue and be sued," 36 U.S.C. § 2
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textual grounds. Likewise, on the appellate level, courts have not confined
themselves to text when interpreting the final order statute 7 or the statute
permitting Supreme Court review of state court decisions." In this light,
then, going beyond the plain meaning of Section 1447(d) is both less startling
and is more consistent with precedent. 9
The order by the much-maligned Judge Hermansdorfer is an example of
practical reasoning. Recall that in remanding, he purported to balance the
defendant's right to statutory removal with the plaintiffs desire to a forum of
choice, the apparent lack of evidence of a hostile forum, and his own docket
concerns.9" While sternly admonished by the Thermtron majority as
incorrect, Judge Hermansdorfer's reasoning is not entirely irrational. True, he
did not point to any statutory language or legislative history. But he might
(1988) confers federal jurisdiction over tort suit agaist Red Cross); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v.
Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992) (literal interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 1292(b) (1988),
holding that former (governing appeals in bankruptcy cases) does not apply to exclusion of latter
(permitting interlocutory appeals in certain circumstances)); see Zeppos, supra note 83, at 1100
& n.109.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988); see, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468
(1978) (permitting "collateral order"exceptionto finality requirement of§ 1291 despite apparent
lack of textual basis for exception).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988); see, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,476-
77 (1975) (utilizing multi-factor test to determine which state cases fall under § 1257).
89. Steinman, supra note 26, at 931 (arguing that if other jurisdictional statutes are
interpreted flexibly, then § 1447(d) should be also).
In a similar vein, one writer has suggested that the Thermtron majority was engaging in
a dialogue with Congress, given that Congress could respond by amending § 1447(d). Kelly,
supra note 74, at 553-54. The dialogue thesis, with respect to many other jurisdictional
provisions, has been fully articulated in Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme
Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990). With regard to whether
the dialogue works, it is worth noting that Congress responds with some frequency to
jurisdictional decisions of the Court by amending the (or a) relevant statute. E.g., Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (inter alia, enacting 28
U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. II 1990) which overrules Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1990)
(limiting pendent party jurisdiction)). For other examples, see Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 383, 423 & n.223 (1991). For general
empirical commentary on Congress' statutory response to jurisdictional decisions, see Eskridge,
supra note 60, at 344-45; Solimine, supra, at 421-24; Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker,
The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L.
REv. 425, 451 n.120 (1992).
With respect to appellate matters, Congress has virtually codified the dialogue itself by
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (Supp. II 1990) in 1990, which permits the Supreme Court, in
exercising its rulemaking power (itself subject to veto by Congress), to define what district court
orders are "final" for purposes of § 1291. Section 2072(c) is subject to extensive and critical
comment in Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PrrT. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript on file with
author).
90. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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have constructed an argument that the Congressional purpose behind removal
was not served in this particular case, and might have relied on the "narrow
construction" canon9' or abstention doctrines to boot. All of which is not
to say that he would necessarily have been correct, but his opinion would have
been in the tradition of flexible interpretation of jurisdictional statutes.
The two opinions in Thermtron itself are examples of practical reasoning.
Not surprisingly, the majority went beyond the text of Section 1447(d) and
relied on its understanding of the evolution and prior judicial interpretations
of subsection (d) and related provisions. The majority also relied on
legislative history and overall Congressional purpose. It concluded that
Congress did not intend to give district judges unreviewable "carte blanche
authority" to remand cases on grounds unauthorized by subsection (c).'
Similarly, the dissent spent much time on its strongest point, the language of
Section 1447(d) itself. But the dissent also considered the evolution of the
statute, prior judicial interpretations, Congressional purpose, and the practical
effects of the decision.
The Thermtron majority fares better under the lens of practical reasoning.
Even so, in my view the dissent has the better of the argument. I have
already considered both opinions' textual arguments. Not much more can be
said about legislative history or purpose. Both opinions cited the former,'
to little effect, since the history is silent on the specific issue raised in
Thermtron. Of more interest is the more general purpose ascribed to
Section 1447(d) and related provisions. Acknowledging the apparent purpose
of preventing delay by "protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues,"9" the
majority nonetheless held that Congress could not have possibly intended td
immunize all district court opinions from appellate review. The dissent
concluded that Congress' purpose was served by such a bar.
While not irrational, the majority's perception of Congressional purpose
is faulty. If the purpose was to limit "protracted litigation," it matters not that
a remand might be for incorrect reasons. Restrictions on review are of little
utility if they can be circumvented by initially asking (as did the majority) if
the decision under review is "correct."' Put another way, it is not illogical
to simultaneously expect district judges to make correct decisions yet to
91. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
92. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 12, at 1452 n.18 (conceptualizing Judge Henmansdorfer's
decision as an exercise of abstention); Carruthers, supra note 59, at 1038 (same).
93. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351.
94. Id at 349 n.15 (majority); id. 359-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 351.
96. See Friedman, supra note 89, at 50 n.246; Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods,
Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review
and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 64 (1975).
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insulate any such decisions (whether "correct" or not) from appellate
review. 7  The bar to review does little good if the putative reviewing
authority is forced to ask in every case if the remand order is within the
bounds of "correctness. "98
In sum, the Thermtron majority opinion legitimately has the aura of
practical reasoning. Having that aura, of course, does not make the opinion
a good example of such reasoning.' While the arguments might be regarded
as somewhat close, ultimately the dissent's view of the text, legislative history
and purpose is more convincing than that of the majority., Perhaps the
majority opinion could have been better justified on the basis of evolutive
considerations. The bar on review was enacted at a time of relatively little
practical review of district court decisions. By 1976, the federal system had
moved away from the "single judge/finality" model,"° and Section 1447(d)
97. For an example of an argument contrary to that posited in the text, consider:
We note that we are not considering the pre-Thermtron question ofwhether Congress
intended to allow review of remand orders. If one focuses on that question, one
might ask, "did not Congress, by prohibiting review of remand orders, in effect
extend carte blanche authority to district courts?" We find the answer is no, for we
can assume that Congress would expect district courts to follow the provisions of the
removal statutes, regardless of whether their decisions were reviewable.
Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1410-11 (7th Cir. 1989).
The Rothner court's analysis seems correct, but it does not necessarily support Thermtron.
The posited Congressional expectation can be obtained without appellate review, by the act of
district judges following the appropriate law.
98. However, there are parallels in administrative law to the Thermtron construction of
§ 1447(d). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) precludes judicial review of administrative
decisions when "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(1988). This requires the reviewing court to examine the organic statute in question (i.e., the
analog to § 1447(c)) to determine if review is precluded. E.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592
(1988); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The parallel only
goes so far, since § 701(a)(1) expressly contains the extra meaning which § 1447(d), by its literal
terms, does not. For another example, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301-11 (1989) (new
rules of criminal procedure may not be applied retroactively to a pending habeas case; "newness"
to be determined by, inter alia, examining precedent at the time the defendant's conviction
became final).
99. See ESKRDGE & FRicKEY, supra note 60, at 362-83 (evaluating practical reasoning
decisions of the Court).
100. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 861 (1984); supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
While not mentioned in either Thermtron opinion, perhaps an underlying rationale was the
knowledge that, under current doctrine, the decision to remand is unreviewable even if the case,
upon removal, works its way up the state court system to the United States Supreme Court. In
1941, the Court unanimously interpreted the predecessor to § 1447(d) to preclude review
"directly" or "indirectly." Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S. 563, 568 (1941); cf
Board of Educ. of City of New York v. City-Wide Comm. for the Integration of Schs., 342 F.2d
284, 284 (2d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (suggesting that exception for § 1443 cases found in
§ 1447(d) means such cases are exempt from Stevens holding). The Stevens opinion is
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might have been seen as an embarrassing vestige of the earlier era. It thus
made sense to construe the statute narrowly to permit greater appellate review.
The dissent did not address such evolutive factors either, perhaps believing
that such a consideration was ruled out by the plain meaning canon. The
evolution of appellate review of remand orders is worth pondering,"' but
the relatively blunt wording of Section 1447(d) makes it difficult to rely on
such factors when interpreting the statute.
HI. POST-THERMTRON DEVELOPMENTS
A. Supreme Court Cases
For twelve years the Court had little to say about Thermtron. One in-
chambers decision by Justice Rehnquist reiterated the bar on remand review
when the district judge purported to rely on Section 144 7 (c),"°2 a holding
consistent with a summary reversal a short time later by the full Court in
another case."°
The Court's next (and latest) exposition of Thermtron was in Carnegie-
Mellon University v. Cohill. °4 There, plaintiffs sued the university in state
court on both federal question and state law claims. After the defendant
removed the case as a federal question, plaintiffs moved to amend their
complaint to delete their federal claims, and to remand the remaining claims
to state court. The district judge granted both motions. While acknowledging
that no statutory provision seemed to authorize a remand in the case, the judge
nonetheless found authority in a court's discretion to deal with pendent state
law claims.1'0  Defendant unsuccessfully sought review in the Third
Circuit, ° and the Court affirmed.
The majority opinion by Justice Marshall held that a district court can
remand to state court (rather than dismiss the case outright) in this situation,
given the discretionary underpinnings of the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
problematic, since the statute does not speak to the issue at all (28 U.S.C. § 1257 governs Court
review of state court decisions), and the legislative history is entirely silent on the matter. On
the other hand, the Stevens result is arguably supported by the purpose of limiting protracted
litigation over the remand decision.
101. See infra Part III.A.
102. Volvo of Am. Corp. v. Schwarzer, 429 U.S. 1331 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).
103. Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723-24 (1977) (per curiam).
104. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
105. Boyle v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
106. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal, given the bar of§ 1447(d), Carnegie-Mellon,
484 U.S. at 347 n.4, and while sitting en banc divided equally on whether a writ of mandamus
should issue, thus effectively denying the writ. Id. at 347-48.
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tion. °' It did not matter not that the removal statutes were silent on the
point. ' 3 As for Thermtron's statements that remands must be on grounds
specified by statute,"° the Court held that those statements "lose[]
controlling force" when read in context." 0 The context was that, unlike
here, the remand in Thermtron was "clearly impermissible,""' so Thermtron
was not controlling. In dissent, Justice White thought it was and adhered to
his opinion in that case that remands were only permissible when authorized
by statute."
2
Carnegie-Mellon thus expanded the permissible bases upon which a
district court may remand a removed case. What impact did it have on the
scope of appellate review of remands? According to the prevailing view,
none. That is, remands not predicated on Section 1447(c) are subject to
review by mandamus, as was the case in Thenntron."3 This result, howev-
107. Id. at 348-53.
108. Id. at 353-55. As of 1990, there is a statute governing pendent (now called
supplemental)jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 11990). The statute permits district courts
to "decline to exercise" such jurisdiction under certain circumstances, § 1367(c), but does not use
the word "remand." It is unclear if § 1367 thus codifies the holding in Carnegie-Mellon. The
legislative history apparently makes no reference to Carnegie-Mellon or to § 1447(c)-(d). See
H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27-30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6873-76. Given this silence, the better interpretation is that § 1367(c) leaves the holding in
Carnegie-Mellon intact. See also Karen Nelson Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute:
An Important But Controversial Supplement to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31, 59
(1992) (§ 1367 fails to address "the special considerations relevant in removed cases").
This reading of § 1367(c) is supported by the recent decision of In re Surinam Airways
Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1255 (11th Cir. 1992). There, the district judge remanded certain claims
in a case, concluding that he was empowered to do so by § 1367. Id at 1257. The appellate
panel held this decision to be reviewable by mandamus, since a partial remand order, pursuant
to § 1367(c), fell within the "Thermtron exception to § 1447(d)." It was, according to the panel,
"a discretionary decision declining the exercise of expressly acknowledgedjurisdiction." Id.
Thus, it was "not a remand premised on either a defect in removal procedure or a lack of
jurisdiction." Idr The court also found this holding to be consistent with Carnegie-Mellon. Id.
109. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
110. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 355.
111. Id at 356.
112. Id at 358-64 (White, J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Scaliajoined
in the dissent.
113. Thus, in Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1989), the court stated:
The other two Thermtron rulings were not disturbed - i.e., (1) because the remand
of the remaining pendent state law claims was a non-1447(c) remand, the § 1447(d)
bar on review was inapplicable, and (2) the Court, after a merits review, affirmed
the appellate court's denial of mandamus.
Id. at 1406. The court held that a remand based on a 'Judge-made rule" (in Rothner, a rule
permitting the right to remove to be waived) was reviewable by mandamus. Id at 1416-18.
Similarly, the dissenting opinion by Judge Easterbrook observed:
Carnegie-Mellon left us with three categories of grounds for remand: (1) those
authorized by § 1447(c) and beyond the power of appellate review; (2) those not
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er, does not inexorably follow. Recall that the Thermtron holding of
reviewability was predicated, in large part, on the majority's perception that
Congress did not intend to permit remands unauthorized by statute. Section
1447(d) was read not to bar review of unauthorized remands. Carnegie-
Mellon expanded the scope of authorized remands. It follows that the
availability of review should be contracted, that the sort of remand in
Carnegie-Mellon should be barred from review under Thermtron's understand-
ing of Section 1447(d)."'
This argument is subject to its own conceptual problems."' Under this
revisionist standard, how is the appellate court to determine if the remand is
authorized? To some extent, the court must peek at the merits of the remand
to determine whether it was authorized or not. This is just the sort of look
required by Thermiron and Carnegie-Mellon. A quick look would determine
only if the remand order were authorized, not if the order were correct., 6
Carnegie-Mellon did not purport to explicitly reach these issues.'17 But
the lower courts have chosen to interpret the case as expanding, rather than
contracting, appellate review. This interpretation is perhaps understandable
given the reasons for remand and the exception to the bar of review. A
careful review of that joinder, however, reveals that expanding authorization
for remand should contract review. The lower courts' failure to do so is
authorized by § 1447(c) but nonetheless lawful in principle and reviewable for error
in execution [e.g., Carnegie-Mellon]; (3) those not authorized by § 1447(c) or
anything else, and subject to automatic reversal [e.g., Thermtron].
Id. at 1420 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964
F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.).
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit appears to hold that the "permissible grounds and means of
reviewing remand orders have expanded considerably" by the Carnegie-Mellon decision.
McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1201 n.1 (5th Cir.
1991).
114. See Steinman, supranote 26, at 1004; cf Hernandez v. Brakegate, Ltd., 942 F.2d 1223,
1226 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.) (in case involving remand by bankruptcy court, "[i]t makes
little sense to take this increase of discretion [regarding a 1978 law] as enlarging appellate
powers."). In contrast, see Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Rothner, supra note 113.
115. Similar problems were raised by the Thermtron dissent. Thermiron, 423 U.S. at 357
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116. There is ample precedent for such a quick look. E.g., Friedman, supra note 89, at 50
n.228 (court has some initial power to determine if a Congressional restriction on jurisdiction
applies to the case; once it so determines, the restriction bars further adjudication); supra note
98 (addressing preclusion of judicial review under § 701(a)(1) of the APA); cf ERwIN
CHEmENSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 150-51 (1989) (arguing that court would retain
jurisdiction to determine constitutionality of the restriction on jurisdiction).
117. Steinman, supra note 26, at 991. The writ of certiorari in Carnegie-Mellon only
concerned the "authorized" aspect of Thermtron, and did not mention the effect, if any, on
reviewability. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 348 (stating why certiorari was granted).
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indicative of their expansion of review in the post-Thermtron era, as the
remainder of Part II will demonstrate.
B. The 1988 Amendment to Section 1447(c)
In 1988, as one of several revisions to the Judicial Code,"' Congress
amended Section 1447(c). At the time of Thermtron, that subsection stated
that a district court shall remand if "at any time before final judgment it
appears that the case was removed improvidentally and without jurisdic-
tion."'1 9 As revised, the subsection states that a motion to remand based on
a "defect in removal procedure" must be made within 30 days after removal,
and the case "shall" be remanded if "at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction."' 0 Subsec-
tion (d) was not revised.
How does this amendment affect the Thermtron interpretation of
subsection (d)? Most authorities seem to think not at all, premised on the
amendment's failure to mention subsection (d). 2' However, the Fifth
Circuit in In re Shell Oil Co."2 recently took a different view. According
to that court, the changes
reflect a congressional intent to delete improvident removal as an unreview-
able basis for remand, at least when a motion to remand based on such
improvident removal is made outside the 30-day time limit. This leaves
remand orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as the only clearly
unreviewable remand orders.123
118. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
119. See supra note 40.
120. The subsection provides:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must
be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under Sec-
tion 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding
the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including
attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of
remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court
may thereupon proceed with such case.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988).
121. See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 5, at 11 n.5; WRiGHr ET AL., supra note 17,
at 700-01 n.11; Alan B. Rich, Current Issues in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 J. Ant L. & COM. 395,
421 (1991); Steinman, supra note 19, at 899-900.
122. 932 F.2d 1518 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 914 (1992). This is the
Castilo case referred to earlier in this Article. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
123. Shell Oil, 932 F.2d at 1520 (footnote omitted).
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In Shell Oil, the district judge had granted a motion to remand, made 30 days
after removal, on the basis that local citizens, whose presence defeated
complete diversity, had not been fraudulently joined.'24 Removal was thus
arguably improper under Section 1441(b).'" Finding this to be a "defect in
removal procedure," not a lack of "subject matter jurisdiction," the Fifth
Circuit found the matter reviewable under a writ of mandamus.'26 The court
also allowed that the result may have been different prior to the amendment,
since the remand was arguably based on "improvident removal.'
127
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the 1988 amendment does not survive
close analysis. Textually, the amendment substituted the "improvidently and
without jurisdiction" language with two sentences. One sentence states that
motions to remand for defects in removal procedure must be made within 30
days of removal; the other states that remands for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction can be made at any.time before final judgment. On its face, this
language appears to permit remands for two reasons, one of which must be
made within 30 days. As long as we follow Thermtron's in pari materia
canon, then any remand predicated on new section 1447(c) should be barred
from review by subsection (d). Presumably, the district judge will be
cognizant of and follow the requirements of new Section 1447(c)-including
the time limit with respectto one type of motion. Perhaps the judge calculates
the 30-day limit incorrectly, or thinks it can be waived under certain
circumstances, or even ignores it. But as long as her action is purportedly
based on Section 1447(c), then it should be insulated from review.'28
This result is also supported by the legislative history of the new
subsection (c).'29 That history makes clear that the drafters sought to limit
124. Id. at 1518-19.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (inter alia, restricts removability of
certain diversity actions).
126. Shell Oil, 932 F.2d at 1520-21.
127. Id. at 1520. Several cases have followed Shell Oil. See In re International Paper Co.,
961 F.2d 558, 561 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 326 (1992); In re Administrators of the
Tulane Educ. Fund, 954 F.2d 266, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316, 319-21
(5th Cir. 1992); cf. Bregman v. Alderman, 955 F.2d 660, 663 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(finding it unnecessary to decide whether to follow Shell Oil). Also as Shell Oil noted, the Third
Circuit seemed to follow a similar approach in Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.
1989). Shell Oil, 932 F.2d at 1520.
128. This follows from the Gravitt case. See supra note 103; see also In re Decorator
Indus. Inc., 980 F.2d 1371, 1373 (1lth Cir. 1992) (assuming that district court relied on §1447(c)
despite lack of citation to that section in district court's opinion); Rich, supra note 121, at 421.
Subsequent to Shell Oil, the Fifth Circuit has held that remand orders premised on timely
remand motions are insulated from review by § 1447(d). In re Medscope Marine Ltd., 972 F.2d
107 (5th Cir. 1992); Hopkins v. Dolphin Titan Int'l, Inc., 976 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1992).
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remands shortly before trial in federal court, and did not narrowly confine the
meaning of "defects" in removal procedure. The term "subject matter
jurisdiction," rather than just "jurisdiction," was apparently utilized to
emphasize that defects in the former in federal court are not waivable or
subject to time limits. Finally, that history makes no reference to Sec-
tion 1447(d) or Thermtron.
Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the text and history of new Sec-
tion 1447(c) as having no substantive impact on the availability of Thermtron-
like review of remand orders. 3° Once again, however, a lower court took
Subsection (c) amends 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) and adds a new subsection (e).
Section 1447(c) now appears to require remand to state court if at any time before
final judgment it appears that the removal was improvident. So long as the defect
in removal procedure does not involve a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction,
there is no reason why either State or Federal courts, or the parties, should be subject
to the burdens of shuttling a case between two courts that each have subject matter
jurisdiction. There is also some risk that a party who is aware of a defect in
removal procedure may hold the defect in reserve as a means of forum shopping if
the litigation should take an unfavorable turn. The amendment provides a period of
30 days within which remand must be sought on any ground other than lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The amendment is written in terms of a defect in
"removal procedure" in order to avoid any implication that remand is unavailable
after disposition of all federal questions leaves only State law questions that might
be decided as a matter of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction or that might instead be
remanded.
The proposal also would amend section 1447(c) to ensure that the court may
order payment of actual expense caused by an improper removal. As noted above,
this provision would replace the bond provision now set out in section 1446(d),
which covers payment of "all costs and disbursements incurred by reason of the
removal proceedings should it be determined that the case was not removable or was
improperly removed."
H.R. REp. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,
6033. The language also appears virtually unchanged in CourtReform andAccess to JusticeAct:
Hearings on H.R. 3152 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 97-98 (1987-88)
(prepared statement of Judge Elmo B. Hunter), and in 134 CONG. Rc. S16284, S16308 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (section-by-section analysis submitted in lieu of a Senate Report).
130. For similar readings ofthe legislative history, see Baldridge v. Kentucky-Ohio Transp.,
Inc., 983 F.2d 1341, 1348 n. I1 (6th Cir. 1993); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402,
1411 (7th Cir. 1989); Rich, supra note 121, at 420-21. While the legislative history does not
seem to refer to Carnegie-Mellon, the last sentence of the first paragraph of the excerpt quoted
in note 129, supra, arguably endorses the result in that case. Even assuming that to be so, there
is little in Carnegie-Mellon itself which speaks to appellate review. See supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
More recently, the Fifth Circuit, after reviewing the legislative history of the new
§ 1447(c), "brief that it is," concluded that "the 'removed improvidently' language of pre-1988
section 1447(c) was replaced, without intent to change the meaning, with the 'defect in removal
procedure' in current section 1447(c)." Medscope Marine, 972 F.2d at 110. While this case
cited Shell Oil earlier in the opinion, id. at 108 nn.3-4, its conclusion is seemingly at odds with
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a more expansive view and expanded the availability of appellate review of
remand orders.
C. Thermtron in the Lower Courts
The previous portions of Part II considered how lower federal courts
responded to post-Thermtron doctrinal and statutory developments. In the
remaining portions of Part II, I consider three other doctrinal exceptions
carved out by the lower courts which permit appellate review even of issues
seemingly not covered by the Thermfron exception.
1. The Substantive Issue Exception
One line of cases has held that review is permitted when the district
judge, in remanding the case, in effect makes a substantive decision on the
merits. The lodestar case is the Ninth Circuit's opinion in 1984 in Pelleport
Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc.' There, a case removed on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction was remanded given the existence of a forum
selection clause in a contract between the parties, which directed all disputes
to be litigated in state court.' The court held that the decision was
reviewable, although the rationale is less than a model of clarity.
Initially, the court held that since the remand was predicated on the
forum selection clause and not on "subject matter jurisdiction," it was not on
a ground specified in Section 1447(c).' Given Thermtron, that should have
ended the matter and review by mandamus could have proceeded. However,
the court went on to hold that the district judge had "reached a substantive
decision on the merits apart from any jurisdictional decision."'34 This made
the former decision a reviewable one, and to hold otherwise would deprive the
defendant "of its right to appeal a substantive determination of contract
law."'35 Several other circuits have followed Pelleport and found remand
decisions reviewable when a "substantive" decision proceeded and formed the
basis of the remand. 36 Other courts are less sure, arguing that the Section
language in Shell Oil. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
131. 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984).
132. IAt at 275.
133. Id at 276.
134. Id
135. Id at 277.
136. See, e.g., Milk 'N' More, Inc. v. Beavert, 963 F.2d 1342,1344 (10th Cir. 1992) (forum
selection clause); McDermottnt'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1204
(5th Cir. 1991) (same); Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 550,554
(9th Cir. 1991) (forum selection clause contained in contract other than one under dispute in
case); Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., Ltd., 933 F.2d 1207, 1211 (3d Cir.) (contract purportedly
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1447(d) bar holds when the "substantive" issue is "intrinsic" to the remand
order, at least when the latter is based on jurisdictional grounds.137
The courts skeptical of Pelleport have the better argument. At the outset,
it is by no means clear that the "substantive" issues in the Pelleport line of
cases, like a clause designating a state court as an exclusive forum, or waiving
the right to remove, are not covered by either version of Section 1447(c). For
example, if the defendant executed such clauses in contracts, would not
removal then be "improvident" (pre-1988), or constitute a "defect in removal
procedure" (post-1988)? 13' As Judge Easterbrook has suggested, the
common usage of "improvident" suggests that it "ought not have been
done"-the right was waived in some manner. 39 The term is not necessari-
ly confined to not following the precise procedural steps required by the
removal statutes. From this, the Pelleport distinction might stand on better
footing given the language of the 1988 amendment, which seems somewhat
narrower than the word "improvident." But the legislative history of that
provision makes fairly clear that no (for lack of a better word) substantive
change was intended-that with respect to the bases for remand, the old and
new versions of Section 1447(c) are in accord."
waived right to remove), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.302 (1991); Regis Assocs. v. RankHotels Mgt.
Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 195 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402,
1416-17 (7th Cir. 1989) (dicta); Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev.
Corp., 838 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1988) (forum selection clause); Clorox Co. v. United States Dist.
Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 779 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1985) (contract purportedly waived right
to remove). But see Baldridge v. Kentucky-Ohio Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1341, 1349-50 (6th Cir.
1993) (holding the Pelleport exception does not encompass remand for lack ofjurisdiction when
district court held that plaintiff's claims were not preempted by federal laws); Ferrari, 940 F.2d
at 557 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Pelleport ought to be overruled).
Some courts have extended the substantive issue exception to matters apart from issues
embodied in contractual papers. E.g., Miami County Municipal Court v. Wright, 963 F.2d 876,
879 n.3 (6th Cir. 1992) (remand order "was based on a substantive determination that [a state
court defendant] had no colorable federal defense to the state contempt proceedings," making
removal improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988)), vacated, 963 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1992).
137. Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 929 F.2d 599, 602 (11th Cir.) (remand
based on lack of complete federal question preemption), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 376 (1991);
Harris v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 951 F.2d 325,329 (11th Cir. 1992) (remand based
on lack of a substantial federal question sufficient to confer jurisdiction).
138. As noted by Judge Noonan, the district judge in Ferrari, who remanded on the basis
of a forum selection clause, thought so, since the judge cited § 1447(c). Ferrari, 940 F.2d at
555 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (quoting district court opinion).
139. Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1421 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also Ferrari, 940 F.2d at
557 (Noonan, J. dissenting) (similar analysis).
140. See In re Medscope Marine Ltd., 972 F.2d 107, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1992); Rothner, 879
F.2d at 1411 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); supranotes 121-30 and accompanying text; cf Shell
Oil, 932 F.2d at 1521-22 (discussing meaning of "any defect in removal procedure" and
suggesting that it includes grounds present before removal).
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Even granting the premise of Pelleport-that some "substantive" decisions
for remands lie outside Section 1447(c)-the rule of that case is problemat-
ic. 141 The core reasoning of Pelleport-that the remand was based on "a
substantive decision on the merits apart from any jurisdictional
decision"--would surely strike most lawyers as unremarkable. From the first
year of law school, most attorneys differentiate between jurisdictional or
procedural issues and the merits of the underlying dispute between the
parties. 42 What is odd is the Pelleport court's application of that principle.
The district court in that case remanded on the basis of a forum selection
clause that appears to have been entirely unrelated to the substantive dispute
between the parties (for breach of contract). 43  Thus, it is difficult to
discern how the issue of the forum selection clause is unrelated to jurisdiction,
or is a decision on the "merits."'144
To be sure, care must be taken to avoid question-begging definitions of
the "merits," "jurisdiction" and related terms. 4  Difficulty in distinguishing
these concepts can also arise when jurisdictional issues are intertwined with
the merits." But when the reason for the remand (call it "substantive" or
141. Concededly, the concession made here is significant, since under the apparent
prevailing view of Carnegie-Mellon, see supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text, the sort
of remand rationale found in Pelleport and related cases is arguably subject to appellate review.
That is, given that there is authority in general to remand removed cases based on the
enforcement of forum selection clauses, or contractual waivers of the right to remove, see
Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization ofProcedure, 25 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 51, 89-90 (1992) (reviewing cases), it seems to follow under the prevailing view that
at least mandamus review is available. If so, is not the "substantive" exception developed by
Pelleport (decided prior to Carnegie-Mellon) now superseded and unnecessary? Perhaps, but the
post-Carnegie-Mellon cases do not seem to recognize this argument, and Pelleport itself appeared
to indirectly argue that § 1447(d) was not intended to bar non-'iurisdictional" remands (as
Pelleport called it). Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 276-77. For these reasons, the internal logic of the
Pelleport exception is still worth examining.
142. Cf WRIGrHT, supra note 16, at 26 ("And a distinction must be drawn between lack of
jurisdiction and want of merits.").
143. Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 275.
144. One commentator has summarized and approved of this aspect of Pelleport without
explaining how the enforcement of the clause is a "merits" decision. Herrmann, supra note 30,
at 415 & n. 112; see also WRiGHT ET AL., supra note 17, at 107 (describing Ninth Circuit cases,
including Pelleport, as "sensible").
145. One is reminded of the long-standing confusion over differentiating "substance" from
"procedure" in a variety of contexts.
146. For example, personal jurisdiction in a state over a non-resident defendant might be
predicated'pn certain communications that also form the basis of a breach of contract action,
which communications the defendant claims never took place. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CiVIL
PROCEDURE 234-35 (5th ed. 1989).
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what have you) is unrelated to the underlying merits, then the logic of the
Pelleport exception to Section 1447(d) collapses. 47
The other reason advanced by Pelleport was that the defendant had a
"right" to appeal a substantive determination of contract law. This rationale
is as shaky as the first. Not surprisingly, Pelleport cited no authority for this
right, for there is none. Absent the bar of Section 1447(d), the defendant
could appeal every issue it raises once the case is over.141 Once the case is
remanded, the statutory right to appeal evaporates.
49
147. Pelleport also cited the Supreme Court's decision in City of Waco v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934) for support. Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 276-77.
Waco involved a removal based on the diversity of a third-party defendant. The district court
dismissed the latter and then remanded the case to state court, because of the lack of diversity
jurisdiction over the remaining parties. The Court held the dismissal matter appealable, despite
the bar to review of remand orders, since "in logic and in fact the decree of dismissal preceded
that of remand." Waco, 293 U.S. at 143. Waco does not support Pelleport, since in the former
case there were two separate determinations, while in the latter the "substantive" issue merged
with and was the reason for the remand. Calderon, 929 F.2d at 602; Braun, supra note 15, at
87 n.44.
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
149. Nor can there be much argument that a "right" to appeal in this context is of
constitutional dimension. Congress' authority to restrict the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts, U.S. CoNsT. arL IH, § 1, carries with it the ability to restrict access to federal appellate
courts. Thermiron, 423 U.S. at 354 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) (describing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a Congressional limit on
appellate jurisdiction). This conclusion follows since under § 1447(d) there is Article I
"review" of the motion to remand, albeit by a single federal district judge, not by an appellate
panel, in addition. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of
1789, 138 U. PA. L. Rv. 1499, 1510 (1990) (arguing that constitutional framers assumed parity
between trial and appellate federal judges).
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2. The Constitutional Issue Exception
In 1991, the Third Circuit in In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated
i! sO created another exception to the bar of section 1447(d), even as now
liberalized by Thermtron and Carnegie-Mellon. In re TMI arose from the
Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear energy plant incident in 1979. Numerous
plaintiffs filed suit in the state courts of Pennsylvania against the owners and
operators of TMI for personal and business injuries, on various state law
grounds.' Much of TMI litigation centered on the import of the Price-
Anderson Act,' which limits -the potential liability of nuclear facility
operators due to an accident.5 3  While the TMI litigation was ongoing,
Congress 'in 1988 passed amendments to the Acts' which, among other
things, created a federal cause of action for nuclear facility liability, albeit one
which would draw on substantive principles of state law.' The amendment
also provided that such actions fell within the original federal question
jurisdiction of district courts and were removable to those courts.' s
Shortly after the amendment, defendants removed the state court actions
to federal court and plaintiffs moved to remand on the bases that the actions
did not "arise under" federal law. The district judge agreed with and granted
the motion under Section 1447(c), concluding that there was no subject-matter
jurisdiction, and that to the extent the amendment vested jurisdiction in a
federal court, it was unconstitutional." 7 However, she also certified an
150. 940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 1262 (1992). This is the Gumby
case referred to earlier in the Article. See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text.
An earlier, one page decision had stated in dicta that constitutional issues (among other
things) did not constitute an exception to § 1447(d) or fall under Thermtron, as long as § 1447(c)
was cited by the district court. See Richards v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 812 F.2d 211,211
(5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987). This apparent conflict with In re TMI
was part of the basis for the plaintiff's unsuccessful petition for writ of certiorari. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 10-11, Gumby v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992) (No.
91-676).
151. The procedural history is considerably more complicated than my brief summary, and
greater detail can be found in In re TMI, 940 F.2d at 836-38.
152. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
153. The Price-Anderson Act is described in greater detail in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63-67 (1978); In re TMI, 940 F.2d at 851-54.
154. Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (1988).
156. 42 U.S.C. §-2210(n)(2) (1988). These aspects of the 1988 amendments were in part
responsive to decisions of the Third Circuit, in prior litigation arising from TMI, that had held
that the Act did not create a federal tort cause of action and was not intended to confer original
federal question or removal jurisdiction upon district courts. In re TMI, 940 F.2d at 837, 844
& n.8.
157. TM/, 940 F.2d at 837-38.
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interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code,' and
defendants sought review on that basis as well as on a writ of mandamus.5 9
The Third Circuit spent ten published pages addressing the plaintiffs'
argument that it lacked appellate jurisdiction given the bar of Section 1447(d).
The court acknowledged that neither the Thermtron nor the Pelleport
exception could be relied upon."6 Unlike Thermtron, the district judge, in
remanding, specifically relied upon the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
mentioned in Section 1447(c). And unlike Pelleport, the district court's
"substantive" decision was squarely a jurisdictional one."'
Notwithstanding the lack of precedent, the Third Circuit nonetheless
found another exception to Section 1447(d), this one purportedly rooted in
congressional intent. The court asserted that in enacting Section 1447(d),
"Congress did not intend to vest the district courts with the authority to make
final determinations regarding the constitutionality of federal statutes."162
The basis for this assertion was the observation that constitutional rulings were
not "the type of determination routinely and regularly made pursuant to
Section 1447(c)."'63 To so hold, the court held, would conflict with the
presumptions that Congressional intent to bar judicial review, or appellate
review, must be clearly expressed.'" The court found no such clear intent
in these circumstances.'65 Moreover, if the remand order could not be
reviewed, then potentially inconsistent results of various district courts would
stand.'" If the Thermtron and Pelleport results are reflective of Congressio-
nal intent, the court thought it "inconceivable" that Congress would have
desired to insulate constitutional issues from appellate review. For these
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988), described in greater detail infra Part H.C.3.
159. Defendants also sought to rely on the collateral order doctrine, described infra
Part II.C.3.
160. TMI, 940 F.2d at 843.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Idr at 844.
164. Id at 845. The court relied on Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) and Pacor, Inc.
v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984) as the source of the respective presumptions. TM, 940
F.2d at 845.
165. TMJ, 940 F.2d at 845.
166. Id at 846. The court also pointed out that the present understanding was that review
of the remand decision by the Supreme Court from a state court was also barred by § 1447(d).
Idr at 845; see supra note 100.
167. TM, 940 F.2d at 846.
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reasons, the court concluded that an appeal was available through Section
1292(b). 161
While I am sympathetic to the policy reasons advanced by the In re TMI
court, 169 the court's analysis is not a convincing example of statutory
interpretation. Nowhere did the court rely on legislative text or history for
creating yet another exception to Section 1447(d)-one which permitted it to
review a district court decision that expressly invoked the language of Section
1447(c). Rather, the court seemed to argue that had Congress really thought
about the issue, it never would have wanted a constitutional decision, which
resulted in a remand, to be insulated from appellate review. 7 While the
court did not invoke the term, the court appeared to rely on the "absurd result"
exception to the plain meaning canon of statutory construction.1
71
Would precluding constitutional issues embodied in remand orders from
federal appellate review be so absurd as to justify another departure from
Section 1447(d)? While amounting to poor policy, the specter raised by In re
Tkv" does not constitute an irrational or absurd result. The court claimed that
such issues are not the ordinary stuff of remand decisions, but in fact many
such orders raise difficult issues of statutory construction, 72 some of which
may postpone Supreme Court consideration of important problems if the
matter is remanded. 3 If important statutory issues are barred from review
by Section 1447(d), there seems to be no principled basis to differentiate such
cases from ones which happen to involve constitutional issues. 4
168. Id. at 847-48. While the district judge had taken the liberty of staying her remand
decision while it was being appealed, the court stated that its analysis would probably hold even
if that were not the case. Id. at 847 n.9.
169. See infra Part III.
170. The court seemed to be engaging in the sort of "imaginative construction" of
Congressional intent advocated by Judge Posner. See POSNER, supra note 68, at 286-93; see also
ESKRiDGE & FRiCKEY, supra note 60, at 329-32 (critiquing Posner's theory). More recently, the
Third Circuit, relying on In re TMJ, held that a remand was unauthorized by the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act (Westfall Act), 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)
(1988), and was reviewable notwithstanding § 1447(d), since the two statutes were to be read
together. Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350 (3rd Cir. 1993).
171. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring);
ESKRIDGE & FRIcKEY, supra note 60, at 339 n.69.
172. See infra Part m11.
173. A point made in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 4 (1983) (finding case had been improperly removed).
174. Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring UpdArticle 111: Legislative Court
Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 142 n.322 (1988). Perhaps one
could better argue in favor of the distinction by observing that the apparently unreviewable
statutory decision by a district judge is subject to modification by Congress, while a constitution-
al decision is of course much more difficult to rectify.
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The In re TMI court also alluded to the statutory canons presuming
judicial reviewability. As I suggested before, 7 these canons lend little
weight to the court's arguments. The presumption in favor of judicial review
is satisfied here, since at least one Article III judge will decide the motion to
remand. To be sure, if the motion is granted, then, absent exception, Section
1447(d) prevents the remaining apparatus of appellate review from engaging.
Assuming it is sensible to read that apparatus into a presumption in favor of
judicial review,1 76 Section 1447(d) is explicit enough to rebut the presump-
tion. The Third Circuit's effort to engage in practical statutory reasoning thus
is unpersuasive.
3. The Interlocutory Appeals Exception
A final exception to the bar of review in Section 1447(d) has been
developed by lower courts under the rubric of interlocutory appeals. Recall
that Thermtron had reiterated the long-standing rule that remand orders were
not final, appealable orders. Therefore, some form of interlocutory review had
to be utilized, such as the writ of mandamus. 77 Since then, other courts
have had occasion to utilize other vehicles of interlocutory review.
17
One method is Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code. It permits a district
judge to certify to the appellate court an interlocutory order that involves a
"controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion," and the resolution of which "may materially advance
175. See supra notes 80-81, 148-49 and accompanying text.
176. The In re TMI court referred to Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984)
as embodying such a presumption. TMI, 940 F.2d at 838; see also supra note 166. Pacor
involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court to federal district court. The Pacor court held that
the general removal provisions did not apply to cases removed to the former court, since the
bankruptcy code had specific provisions dealing with that issue. Hence, despite the bar to review
found in 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (1988) (which reads much like § 1447(d)), appellate review was
available. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 990-92. Pacor has apparently been accepted by one other circuit,
In re Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp., 837 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 1988), and rejected in
two others. Hemandez v. Brakegate, Ltd., 942 F.2d 1223, 1225 (7th Cir. 1991); Sykes v. Texas
Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1987). In re TMI itself chose to read Pacor as confined
to the bankruptcy context. TMI, 940 F.2d at 838-39 n.4.
In the course of its opinion, Pacor seemed to fashion a presumption in favor of appellate
judicial review, but the only authority it cited were cases finding a presumption of judicial
review generally. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 992. Thus, this aspect of Pacor stands on shaky doctrinal
ground. Nonetheless, one can posit such a presumption. Probably, if most legislators or lawyers
were to think about it, "judicial review" would include some sort of appellate review (if an
appeal is initially lodged in a trial court). For these and other reasons, see infra Part m, one
could develop a statutory canon of construction presuming in favor of appellate review.
177. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
178. The scope of review of some of these other devices can be broader than that of
mandamus. See infra Part HI.B.
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the ultimate termination of the litigation."' 79 The appropriate circuit may
accept the certification in its discretion.' Both the district court' and
the Third Circuit"u in In re TM.! held that Section 1292(b) was an avenue
of appeal, other than mandamus. Other courts have disagreed, on the basis
that since Section 1447(d) excludes review "by appeal or otherwise,"
certification appeals are not available. 3
There was little explication of Section 1292(b) in the In re TM! opinions.
If one were to read section 1447(d) literally, then it seems to bar all appellate
review. Nor is there anything in the text or legislative history of Section
1292(b) (enacted in 1958) which would carve out an exception to Section
1447(d)." 4 Once literalism is discarded by Thermtron, however, there
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988). The meaning of this text is considered in Michael E.
Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutoy Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1165, 1171-74, 1193-96 (1990).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
181. In re TMI Coordinated Proceedings II, 735 F. Supp. 640, 646-47 (M.D. Pa. 1990),
rev'don other grounds, 940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992).
182. 7M, 940 F.2d at 847-48.
183. See Krangel v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(disagreeing with In re TMI); see also Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., No. 92-7487,
slip op. (2d Cir. June 16, 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 599 (1992); National Audubon Soc'y
v. Department of Water, 858 F.2d 1409, 1417 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Bear River Drainage Dist.,
267 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir. 1959).
184. See Solimine, supranote 179, at 1194-95 (discussing legislative history of§ 1292(b));
ALI Study, supra note 33, at 417 (apparently assuming that present § 1292(b) does not provide
an exception to § 1447(d)).
It has recently been suggested, in an unsuccessful certiorari petition, that § 1292(b) does
limit § 1447(d), and that such a reading is compelled by the Court's recent decision in
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992). See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 17-20, Dow Chemical Co. v. Brown, 113 S. Ct. 599 (1992) (No. 92-438). For
several reasons this argument is not compelling.
First, it is difficult to contend that § 1292(b) is more narrowly drawn than § 1447(d) and
therefore controls over the latter. Section 1292(b) governs interlocutory appeals in all civil cases,
while § 1447(d) limits appeals of a narrow type of order in civil cases, i.e., those remanding a
case back to state court after removal. Hence, the latter provision is more properly viewed as
narrower than the former. Accord Bear River, 267 F.2d at 851. Similarly, a review of the
legislative history of § 1292(b), as noted above, reveals no reference to § 1447(d) or a limitation
on that provision.
Second, it would not necessarily serve the underlying purposes of the present statutes to
permit§ 1292(b) to be an exception to § 1447(d). Section 1292(b) is generally thought to permit
trial time to be saved by allowing potentially case-dispositive issues to be definitively resolved
by the court of appeals prior to trial. Solimine, supra note 179, at 1173. In contrast, section
1447(d) serves the time-saving goal by (on its face) not permitting any appeal at all. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text. It embodies no inherent error correction mechanism as does
§ 1292(b).
Finally, the Germain case does not stand for a contrary proposition. In that case, the Court
unanimously held that 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (198'), which gives courts of appeals jurisdiction over
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seems no good reason to confine review permitted by that case and Carnegie-
Mellon to mandamus." 5 Instead, other models of review are appropriate,
especially if the Court adheres to the assumption that remand orders are not
final under Section 1291 of the Judicial Code.
Another type of interlocutory review is the collateral order doctrine. That
doctrine permits decisions not otherwise final to be immediately appealed if
the order would "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."'86 The Ninth
Circuit in Pelleport held that these criteria had been satisfied,'87 a ruling
followed by several other courts.'88 Other courts are less persuaded.'89
appeals from final orders of district courts sitting as appellate courts in bankruptcy, did not
prohibit § 1292(b) from being used to permit appellate review of an interlocutory decision of a
district court in the same capacity. Germain, 112 S. Ct. at 1148-50. The Court was split in its
rationale. A five-member majority, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, found the result compelled
by the plain meaning of the respective statutes. Id. Finding the provisions ambiguous, Justice
Stevens looked to legislative history of § 158(d) which, he said, contained "no mention of an
intent to limit the scope of § 1292(b)." Id at 1150 (Stevens, J., concurring). Three other
Justices concurred on the basis that any purported redundancy between the statutes was
inadvertent. Id. at 1151 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Germain is at best indirectly relevant to the intersection of § 1292(b) and § 1447(d), for
those provisions on their face, unlike those in Germain, work at cross purposes. In Germain,
both statutes permitted appellate review, albeit under different circumstances, of district court
decisions in certain bankruptcy matters. In contrast, § 1447(d) prohibits review of certain final
orders, while § 1292(b) in some circumstances permits review of certain non-final orders.
Moreover, finality in the bankruptcy context is thought to be more flexible than usual, given the
ongoing nature of many bankruptcy proceedings and the necessity of resolving discrete issues
at various points in those proceedings. 16 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3926 (Supp. 1992). Germain might well have been informed by such
considerations, see In re Gould, 977 F.2d 1038, 1041 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992), which have less
relevance for the non-bankruptcy cases governed by § 1447(d).
185. TMI, 940 F.2d at 847 (making same point); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 17, at 715
(§ 1292(b) should be available in this context as long as district judge stays order of remand to
allow appellate proceedings to take place).
186. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 684, 688
(1993); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). The collateral order doctrine
is generally discussed in Solimine, supra note 179, at 1169-71, 1184-92.
187. Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 277-78.
188. McDermottnt'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters ofLondon, 944 F.2d 1199,1201-04 (5th
Cir. 1991); Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., Ltd., 933 F.2d 1207, 1211 n.6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 302 (1991); Milk 'N' More, Inc. v. Beavert, 963 F.2d 1342, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1992);
Regis Assocs. v. Rank Hotels Mgt. Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1990); Karl Koch
Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1988);
cf TMI, 940 F.2d at 848 n.11 (finding it unnecessary to reach the issue).
189. In Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 929 F.2d 599 (1lth Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 376 (1991), the court considered a slight variation of the Pelleport use of the
collateral order doctrine. In Calderon, defendant argued that a determination of a "substantive
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Like my conclusion with respect to Section 1292(b), the collateral order
exception should be available to the extent that remand orders are reviewable
at all after Thermtron and Carnegie-Mellon. The typical remand order will
satisfy all the criteria of the exception: it determines a disputed issue, resolves
an issue "completely separate from the merits of the action," and given Section
1447(d) is effectively unreviewable on appeal.'O Ironically, this conclusion
guts the logic of the substantive issue exception of Pelleport. Recall that the
exception was premised on the belief that the substantive issue (like the
validity of a forum selection clause) was a decision on the merits apart from
any jurisdictional one. 9" If that is so, then the second criterion of the
collateral order exception should not be able to be satisfied, for the disputed
issue would not be separate from the "merits." Perhaps one could reconcile
the apparent disparity by designating two types of "merits" or "substantive"
issues-one related to the underlying action, the other concerning jurisdiction-
al or procedural issues. The collateral order doctrine is concerned with
reviewing the second, as does Pelleport, and thus Pelleport-type issues meet
the test. That may be so, but it does not square with Pelleport's insistence
that its "merits" decision was not jurisdictional or procedural.
issue" which preceded the remand, see supraPart I.C.I., would itself be appealed as a collateral
order. The argument was rejected. Calderon, 929 F.2d at 602; see also Rothner, 879 F.2d at
1419 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (after Thermtron, "[r]emands may be reviewed, if at all, by
mandamus .. ").
Judge Easterbrook argued inn re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706,712 (7th
Cir. 1992), that the collateral order doctrine was not applicable since the third prong of the test
was not satisfied. According to him, the holding of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1983) (given res judicata effect of state court
suit, stay of federal court proceedings pending resolution of former suit left defendant
"effectively out of court") did not control, since the "point of Moses H. Cone was that the
litigation was (effectively) over, while a remand, like a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404,
continues the litigation in another forum." Amoco Petoleum, 964 F.2d at 712. He also argued
that Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (denial of enforcement of forum selection
clause not immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine since third prong of test not
satisfied), supported this conclusion. Amoco Petroleum, 964 F.2d at 712. Therefore, mandamus
was the only remedy available. Id. at 713.
190. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10-11 (interlocutory order which "effectively" leaves
defendant out of federal court satisfies third prong of test); Steinman, supra note 26, at 1006-07.
Unlike Judge Easterbrook, see supra note 189, I am persuaded that Moses H. Cone is on point,
and that while it is (literally) the same litigation that continues in another forum (unlike Moses
H. Cone), the defendant is still (indeed, more so) effectively out of federal court. Similarly,
Lauro Lines is not dispositive, since in that situation the case lived on in federal court (to be
sure, the forum disliked by the defendant), but the matter was eventually appealable if embodied
in a final order. Thus, the third prong is not met in Lauro Lines, while it is met with a typical
remand order. See Milk 'N' More, 963 F.2d at 1345 (similar reasoning with regard to Lauro
Lines).
191. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
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IV. TOWARDS RATIONAL APPELLATE REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS
A. The Necessity of Appellate Review
In previous parts of this Article, I have suggested that Thermtron, and its
progeny in the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, are dubious
exceptions to the bar of appellate review of remand orders found in Section
1447(d). That conclusion is reached using standard tools of statutory
construction. However, as a matter of sound judicial policy, the cases (at least
considered individually) are far more defensible, for the rationales in favor of
retaining a literally-read Section 1447(d) are problematic.
The bar on appellate review is indeed an anachronism in the federal court
system. As Judith Resnik has observed, the trend in federal courts over the
past two centuries has been away from the model of a single judge reaching
a final, unreviewable decision-the sort exemplified by a pre-Thermtron
reading of Section 1447(d)."9 Appellate review is generally conceded to
serve numerous salutary values, from both a litigant-oriented perspective (e.g.,
empowering litigants, having their day in court) 93 and a systemic perspec-
tive (e.g., diffusing power, increasing rationality and consistency, ensuring
adequate law development, providing for error correction).9 Section 1291
of the Judicial Code generally provides that final orders of district courts are
appealable, and interlocutory appeals additionally make up a generous portion
of the appellate workload.' Section 1447(d) stands out, then, as a rather
stark exception.
Systemic reasons do not justify the exception. While reducing or
eliminating the statutory ability to remove has become popular as of late, 96
192. Resnik, supra note 100, af 860-62.
193. Id. at 845-49; Scott Barclay & Jerry Goldman, Does Procedural Justice Plus Appellate
Process Equal Appellate Justice? (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law and Society
Association, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June 26-29, 1991) (on file with author).
A cautionary note in this regard is sounded by Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to
Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L. 62 (1985), who argues that given the high rate
of affirmance by appellate courts (among other reasons), it is by no means clear one appeal as
of right in every case necessarily maximizes litigants' satisfaction. I have argued that Dalton
somewhat overstates his case, since "[a]ppeals may give litigants the impression of fairness (even
if they lose) or the satisfaction of finality (if they win)." Solimine, supra note 179, at 1177
(footnote omitted). For an empirical study of litigants' attitudes toward appeal, see Scott
Barclay, The Act of Appealing: Challenging a Cost/Benefit Analysis of Appealing (1992) (on
file with author).
194. Resnik, supra note 100, at 849-58; Solimine, supra note 179, at 1175-76; Martin
Shapiro, Appeal, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 629, 631-41 (1980).
195. See PosNER, supra note 68, at 72-73 (review of a sample of published appellate
opinions in 1983 showed, inter alia, that 12% were not appeals after a final judgment).
196. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54
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that opportunity remains an oft-used" portion of the Code. As long as it
stands, district court policing of removal and remands should be subject to the
same type and scope of review as are other district court decisions. 19
Recently, Judge Easterbrook has suggested that Section 1447(d) simply
"fortifies principles that defer review of orders allocating cases among
forums."' 9 He then referenced several illustrative collateral order cases.2°"
Judge Easterbrook's suggestion is problematic. Many district court decisions
affecting fora are appealable, as long as they are embodied in final orders.201
True, if they are not final orders, then appellate review is deferred until the
time (if at all) the decision is embodied in a final order. Thus, for practical
reasons appellate review may be lost entirely (not unlike with Section
1447(d)). But that is more of a function of the final order rule than of
jurisdictional peculiarities.
Removals by defendants are another type of forum-shopping,2" as
indeed are motions to remand, and successful motions which send the
litigation off to another forum ought to be appealable-as much as are
successful motions to dismiss for other jurisdictional reasons. Indeed, the lack
of symmetry in the present regime is accentuated by the ability of defendants
BROOK. L. Rsv. 1057, 1084-92 (1989) (arguing that removal of § 1983 actions should be
prohibited); supra note 14 and accompanying text. But see Solimine, supra note 89, at 427
(arguing contra to Herman, though supporting "modest restraints on the ability to remove.")
(footnote omitted).
197. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
198. I am not necessarily arguing that appellate review is needed to protect some supposed
inviolate "right" to a federal forum. Cf Steinman, supra note 26, at 1008-10 (appearing to make
this argument). I have elsewhere argued in favor of concurrent jurisdiction between federal and
state courts. Solimine, supra note 89. Rather, I contend that until or unless removal jurisdiction
is eliminated, then appellate review of remands should be available since other fora allocations
decisions are (usually) reviewable. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
199. Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1419 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting); see also In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 712-13 (7th Cir.
1992) (Easterbrook, J.).
200. Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1419 (referring to Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495
(1989) (denying enforcement of a forum selection clause is not a collateral order)); see also Van
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988) (denying motion to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds not a collateral order); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U.S. 271 (1988) (denying stay of federal court proceedings not a collateral order).
201. Dismissals for lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, on abstention grounds,
and for forum non conveniens come immediately to mind.
202. Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HA V. L. REV. 1677, 1679 (1990). There
is a considerable empirical literature (consisting mostly of recorded perceptions of attorneys)
which addresses why one might favor a federal court over a state court, or vice-versa, which is
reviewed and supplemented in Victor E. Flango, Attorneys'Perspectives on Choice of Forum In
Diversity Cases, 25 AKRON L. 1,Ev. 41 (1991). A similar survey with respect to attorneys who
removed cases from state to federal court is found in Miller, supra note 15, at 392-423.
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to eventually obtain successful review of denial of remand orders, typically
after the merits have been litigated.2'a
Similarly, the policy reasons usually advanced in favor of Section
1447(d) are, at least in the present day, unconvincing. The traditional
rationales have been to lessen appellate workloads and prevent delay in the
resolution of remanded cases.20 4 Of course, neither purpose is a frivolous
one, but they prove too much. Remanded cases take up less than two percent
of the civil docket,2"5 and if all were appealed it would add but minuscule
numbers to the federal appellate docket."e6 Proposals to restrain growth in
federal appeals are worth study," 7 but more systematic curtailment is logical
rather than eliminating review of one type of case. Nor is delay to the
litigants a minor issue, but that cost must be measured against the possibility
of having the case tried in a state forum when a federal one was statutorily
available. Some additional delay does not seem too high a price to pay, given
the possibility of an erroneous remand decision being corrected by the
appellate court. °8
The last point relates to another rationale for the bar on review, found in
more recent writings. The argument runs that the sort of jurisdictional
analysis found in most remand decisions is, relatively at least, unlikely to be
erroneous and thus appellate review, if not unnecessary, is less necessary.2"
No empirical basis for this assumption is cited, and it seems to stand on
dubious grounds. It would be difficult to objectively differentiate "hard" from
203. See Rothfield, supra note 12, at 243; see, e.g., Belser v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 965 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1992) (summary judgment granted to defendants vacated and denial
of motion to remand reversed); Van Camp v. AT&T Info. Sys., 963 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied 113 S. Ct 365 (1992); Doe v. Kerwood, 969 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1992) (denial of
remand reviewed under § 1292(b) and reversed); cf Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co., 963 F.2d 1142
(8th Cir. 1992) (denial of motion to remand reversed following appeal by plaintiff after some
of her claims were dismissed by trial court, and other claims were voluntarily dismissed by
plaintiff); Neal v. Brown, 980 F.2d 747, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (denial of motion
to remand is not immediately appealable as a final decision, nor under the collateral order
doctrine).
204. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 13 and 15 and accompanying text.
206. Braun, supra note 15, at 89-91 (arguing, inter alia, that at most repeal of § 1447(d)
would increase caseload of each active federal appellate judge by about 24 per year).
207. See, e.g., Federal Courts Report, supra note 14, at 109-31; Erwin Chemerinsky &
Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rnv. 67, 72-74; Dalton,
supra note 193.
208. Steinman, supra note 26, at 1009.
209. See, e.g., Hemandez v. Brakegate, Ltd., 942 F.2d 1223, 1226 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Easterbrook, J.); Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1411 n.9; id. at 1422 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting);
Herrmann, supra note 30, at 414.
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"easy" cases.21  Under any reasonable standard, however, it is hard to
conclude that the issues raised in remand motions are "easy" ones, subject to
quick and correct disposition by federal district judges. One is hard pressed
to label such issues as preemption by federal law,"' whether a case arises
under federal law, and the citizenship of diverse parties 1 as particularly
easy, non-controversial ones. My sense is that these issues are not systemati-
cally easier or harder than other jurisdictional or procedural issues routinely
decided by federal districtjudges. If that is the case, then such issues should
also be subject to appropriate appellate review.
210. With regard to the opinions themselves, one might measure the length of the opinion,
or the number of cases cited, as indicia of the difficulty of the issues raised. See POSNER, supra
note 68, at 73 (longer opinions may signal greater complexity of issues); Lawrence M. Friedman
et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 773, 777-78
(length of opinion may distinguish "hard" from "easy" cases), 795 (1981) (same with respect to
citation patterns).
With regard to appellate opinions, one might measure the rate of reversal of district court
decisions that did not remand a case, or did remand and review was successfully obtained despite
the bar of § 1447(d). See Solimine, supra note 179, at 1189-90 (empirical study of reversals as
an indicator of whether interlocutory appeal is appropriate).
Such studies would be subject to numerous difficulties of implementation and usefulness.
For example, if restricted to published opinions, the data may be skewed, and examining
appellate opinions would be problematic, since many remands are presumably not appealed to
the extent § 1447(d) is still alive.
211. Under certain circumstances, a defense that the plaintiff's cause ofaction is completely
preempted by federal law subjects the case to removal. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386 (1987). Difficult questions in this regard can be raised by such statutes as § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), e.g., Hayden v. Reickerd, 957 F.2d
1506 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding removal improvidentally granted); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and
the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 575, 605 (1992) (recent
Supreme Court cases have "not simplified the [§ 301] preemption doctrine."), or various
provisions of ERISA, e.g., Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.
1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (noting "difficulty" of preemption inquiry in removal context).
212. Diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) can be removed under certain
circumstances to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988). Questions with respect to
measuring the amount in controversy requirement, or the citizenship of certain juridical entities,
e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990) (limited partnership, 5-4 decision);
Schwartz v. Electronic Data Sys., Inc., 913 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1990) (subsidiary of parent
corporation; 2-1 decision), continue to generate litigation. See Deborah J. Fritsche, Removal:
Making a Federal Case Out of It, LrMG. Fall 1990, at 38, 38-40.
213. See Steinman, supra note 26, at 1009 n.405.
Some have argued that if § 1447(d) is repealed or modified, appeal should be limited to
remands in federal question, but not diversity cases. Braun, supra note 15, at 81, 88; Herrmann,
supra note 30, at 414. While this approach would have the virtue of lessening the additional
increase in appellate caseload, see Miller, supra note 15, at 389-92 (study of all private party
cases removed in 1987 showed that federal question cases constituted 3 10/, and diversity cases
69%; data essentially the same for remanded cases), it rests on a faulty empirical premise. It is
difficult to conclude that federal question issues are systematically more difficult than diversity
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A further defense of the Section 1447(d) bastion has been raised by the
Judicial Conference of the United States. In 1989, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals recommended that the Judicial Conference propose a repeal of Section
1447(d), for the reason that the statute, and its operation in Thermtron and
later cases had become unfair and unclear. 14  The Judicial Conference
rejected the proposal, arguing that repeal would raise federal caseloads, lead
to delays, and "disrupt the existing balance between state and federal
courts."
215
The concerns of the Judicial Conference are not well-founded. I have
already suggested that fears of increased caseload and delay, while not
inconsequential, are not compelling enough to delete an entire class of cases
from appellate review.21 6 Similarly, the Conference does well to respect the
integrity of state courts and litigation in those courts. In a variety of contexts,
the Court has recognized state court sovereignty by restricting the ability of
federal courts to interfere with criminal or civil litigation in state courts.17
In some circumstances, such sovereignty concerns may be of constitutional
dimensions. 21' But those concerns are barely raised, if at all, by a repeal of
Section 1447(d). The main culprit is removal jurisdiction itself, and the Court
long ago rejected constitutional attacks on such jurisdiction.1 9 The delay
occasioned by an appeal of a remand order could only be a minor irritant, if
it is perceived as problematic at all, by state courts. This is especially true
given the small numbers of cases in question, relative to the amount of civil
issues, or at least different enough to justify potentially corrective review in one but not the
other. To the extent the distinction rests on the greater "importance" given federal question
cases, that perception is belied by the existence of the diversity statute and the ability to remove
some diversity cases.
214. The article by Jerome Braun is an "outgrowth" of the Ninth Circuit proposal. Braun,
supra note 15, at 79 n.*.
215. 1989 ANNuAL REPORT PROCEEDINGS OF Tm JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 63.
216. Cf Charles G. Geyh, Complex-Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REv.
LnriO. 401,405 (1991) (Judicial Conference particularly concerned with caeeload and workload
problems).
217. A list of examples would be long. The various abstention doctrines come to mind, see
BATOR ET AL. supra note 12, at 1308-1454, as do the interpretations of the federal habeas corpus
statute, id. at 1465-1578. For a recent overview, see Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court
Resource, 44 VAND. L. REv. 953 (1991).
218. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2429-30 (1992); Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 372 (1990).
219. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880).
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litigation in state courts."2 It would be unfortunate if the Judicial Confer-
ence did not reconsider its position.
B. The Scope of Review
If Section 1447(d) is repealed, what type of appellate review should be
afforded an order granting a remand motion? One proposal would simply
utilize the normal appellate procedures used to review final orders."2
Another, building on Thermtron itself, would limit review to a putatively more
expeditious writ of mandamus.m A final suggestion is to utilize Section
1292(b), or some variant thereof.2 3
Of these options, the first and third are the most viable, If remand orders
are to be upgraded to equal status to other appealable decisions, there is little
reason to confine the scope of normal appellate review. Writs of mandamus,
which may be placed on accelerated briefing and disposition schedules in
appellate courts, 4 are confined to reaching only obvious legal error by
district judges.' In contrast, ordinary appellate review, while presuming
correctness of factual findings, 6 is typically plenary with respect to legal
issues.' 7 Using the writ of mandamus model may ameliorate problems of
delay at the cost of unnecessarily confining appropriate appellate review of the
remand order.
The remaining options for review stand on relatively equal footing in that
both provide for plenary review and can be tailored to lessen the delay
problem. For example, appeals of remand orders could be scheduled for
accelerated disposition, 8 or decided by a single circuit judge or upon a
220. Compare supra notes 13 & 15 and accompanying text (indicating number of cases
removed and remanded) with Brian J. Ostrom, Changing Caseloads: The View From the State
Courts, ST. CT. J., Spring 1992, at 11, 11 (18.4 million civil cases filed in state trial courts in
1990).
221. Braun, supra note 15, at 90-92; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 17, at 709.
222. Rothfield, supra note 12, at 243.
223. ALI Study, supra note 33, at 417-18 (calling for amendment of § 1292 to cover
remand orders); Markowski, supra note 12, at 1110-11 (use § 1292(b) as model but modify to
make certification by district judge unnecessary).
224. Rothfield, supra note 12, at 243.
225. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296,309 (1989); CHARLES A. WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 184, § 3933 (1977); ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 553-62 (1987); see also In re Glass Workers Local No. 175, 983 F.2d 725 (6th Cir.
1993) (successful mandamus petition of a remand of pendant state law claims); In re Sandahl,
980 F.2d 1118,1120 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (distinguishing scope ofmandamus review from
usual appellate review).
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
227. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991).
228. E.g., FED. R. APP. P. 2 (normal briefing rules and time limits may be suspended in
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prompt recommendation by the staff attorneys office of the circuit court. 9
Similarly, disposition of certificationmotions under Section 1292(b) generally
are decided on a prompt basis,2so and once the appellate court accepts the
question, briefing and disposition could be speeded up as well. Section
1292(b) also requires permission from the district judge to appeal. The
American Law Institute regarded this as an appropriate measure to deter
frivolous appeals and keep delay to a minimum."3l The Institute's sugges-
tion is sound, since I have previously concluded that district judges do not, in
general, underuse Section 1292(b) and thus usually do not refuse to certify
difficult issues on which reversal is more likely than usual. 2 As a rough
compromise of the competing policy concerns, the Section 1292(b) model
stands as the best choice. 3
C. The Costs of and Paths to Reform
Repealing or significantly amending Section 1447(d) will not come cost-
free. As outlined above, providing another avenue of appeal will increase the
costs and delay of litigation of cases where there is a remand order, and add
to the caseload of the federal appellate courts. Moreover, a reform would
place another weapon in the hand of removing defendants, giving them more
leverage to extract settlements or take other action in the case. 2 4 But such
costs are attendant to any regime which provides for appellate review of final
orders, and it is difficult to argue that remand orders should be singled out for
special treatment. These costs can be significantly ameliorated by placing
restrictions on the ability to remove and deciding such appeals on an
accelerated basis.
certain classes of cases).
229. Braun, supra note 15, at 90-92.
230. Solimine, supra note 179, at 1200.
231. ALI Study, supra note 33, at 417-18; cf Markowski, supra note 12, at 1111-12 (argues
that § 1292(b) model should be modified to eliminate requirement that district judge certify the
question, to prevent district judges from not certifying so as to keep case off their docket);
Martineau, supra note 89 (endorsing this model of review for interlocutory appeals in general).
232. Solimine, supra note 179, at 1201-04. While it is difficult to determine the attitude
of many appellate judges to § 1292(b) appeals, id. at 1202, some courts more recently have
expressly endorsed the use of certification appeals in appropriate cases. E.g., Horwitz v. Alloy
Automotive Co., 957 F.2d 1431, 1434-35 (7th Cir. 1992).
233. The alternative certification model posited by Markowski (see supra note 232) is
unnecessary, since it is unrealistically premised on strategic behavior by fedetal district judges.
See also Solimine, supra note 179, at 1183 n.98 (critical of alternative model in general).
234. Cf Lee, supra note 59, at 536 n.128 (reporting that Thermtron settled before trial in
federal court for an amount "slightly in excess of what had been offered before suit was filed.")
(quoting letter from defense counsel).
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If some sort of reform of Section 1447(d) is thought necessary, will
Congress likely respond? At first blush, it might be thought that Congress
would pay relatively little attention to a seemingly esoteric subject like
appellate review of remand orders."3 In fact, Congress deals with procedur-
al and jurisdictional matters in the federal courts with some frequency," 6
and its action in the 1964 Civil Rights Act shows awareness, and willingness
to modify the bar of Section 1447(d). Similarly, in 1978 Congress added a
provision to the bankruptcy code, apparently modeled after Section 1447(d),
which bars review "by appeal or otherwise" of bankruptcy court orders
remanding cases to state court. 37 Congress has also demonstrated awareness
of appellate review, in this context, by providing for review of district court
remands in several recent (to date, unenacted) bills dealing with complexlitigation.23
Enthusiasm for the prospects of Congressional action must be tempered
by the negative response of the Judicial Conference, as well as by the
possibility of opposition from other interest groups (like the plaintiffs'
bar).29 Advocating such change, however, is a better course than simply
adhering to the status quo. To be sure, Thermtron and its progeny do provide
235. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2, 10 (1988) ("in an area like civil procedure,. . . Congress is quite inattentive
... ."); cf Lee, supra note 59, at 537 n.135 (post-Thermtron communication with member of
House Judiciary Committee indicated that Committee did "not contemplate action on § 1447(c)
or (d).").
236. See sources cited supra note 89.
237. 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1988). Section 1452(a), passed in 1984, recodifies 28 U.S.C.
§ 1478(a) (1982), enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§ 241(a), 92 Stat. 2670 (1978). The legislative history of the 1978 Act explicitly recognizes
§ 1447(d) as the model. H.R. R1Ep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 & n.320 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 596,3, 6013. However, the history also contains a cryptic citation to
Thermtron, id. at 51 n.321, which one commentator apparently read to mean that § 1478(a)
included a Thermtron-like exception (i.e., only "authorized" remands were nonreviewable).
Richard B. Levin, Bankruptcy Appeals, 58 N.C. L. REV. 967, 993-94 n.200 (1980). For a
summary of judicial interpretation of §§ 1478(a) & 1452(b), see supra note 178.
238. E.g., H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 304(2)-(3) (1988) (provided for some
appellate review of remands to state court for damage hearings, after liability determinations in
federal court); H.RL 2450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (3) (1991) (same provision). The legislation
is generally described in Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Jurisdictional and Transfer Proposals for
ComplexLitigation, 101REv. LIT. 325 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, ComplexLitigation Reform and
Article ll Jurisdiction, 59 FoRDHAM L. Re. 169 (1990). Further discussion of appellate review
of remand orders when federal courts dispose of complex litigation is found in American Law
Institute, Complex Litigation Project 74-75 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1990); American BarAssociation,
Commission on Mass Torts, Report to the House of Delegates 73-74 (1989).
239. The role of interest groups with respect to procedural or jurisdictional legislation in
general is addressed by Geyh, supra note 217, and Larry Kramer, "The One-Eyed are Kings":
Improving Congress's Ability to Regulate the Use of Judicial Resources, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1991, at 73.
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some avenues around Section 1447(d). Those exceptions have come at a high
cost to doctrinal consistency, and the lower court exceptions are not followed
in all the circuits.2' The valid policy rationales apparently driving those
exceptions could be better accommodated by repealing or amending Section
1447(d).
V. CONCLUSION: DOES DOCTRINE CouNT?
Much of this Article has engaged in rather traditional doctrinal analysis.
Recently, it has been suggested that such scholarship has become pass6. It has
become fashionable to attribute jurisdictional decisions of the Supreme Court
to the ideology of the justices with respect to the type of suits being
brought.241 So much is doctrine said to be tortured to serve those values
that some argue that federal courts scholarship should eschew "close doctrinal
analyses" and focus on "ideology" and "political undercurrents." 2
Since Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Law and Economics has
subjected virtually every area of the law to this sort of analysis, it is difficult
to see why procedural and jurisdictional issues should be especially immune.
Taken on its own terms, however, the "doctrine doesn't count" model has
limited explanatory power for analyzing Thermtron and its progeny. For
example, some have suggested that the Thermtron dissent is indicative of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's hostility toward diversity jurisdiction (since the
240. In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706,708 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook,
J.) (noting "difficult" and "complex" task of determining in any given case whether exceptions
to § 1447(d) have been satisfied).
Another reform path might simply be to overrule Thermtron and reinstate a "no-exceptions"
application of § 1447(d). Such a development is unlikely, since the Court is loath to overrule
cases of statutory interpretation since Congress can revise the statute in question. Hilton v. South
Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 564 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361, 1366-67 (1988). At any rate, while overruling
Thermtron would have the virtue of serving doctrinal consistency, it would come at the high cost
(for the reasons stated in Part I of this Article) of eliminating any appellate review of motions
to remand.
241. E.g., ROBERT M. COVER, Er AL., PRocEnUR 1540-69 (1988); Nancy Levit, The
Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NoTR
DAME L. REV. 321 (1989); Resnik, supra note 100, at 1007; see also David P. Bryden, Is the
Rehnquist Court Conservative?, PuB. INTEREST, Fall 1992, at 73; Gregory Rathjen & Harold
Spaeth, Access to the Federal Courts: An Analysis of Burger Court Policy Making, 23 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 360 (1979).
242. Richard A. Matasar, Treatise Writing and Federal Jurisdiction Scholarship: Does
Doctrine Matter When Law is Politics?, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1499, 1508-19 (1991) (book review).
Other writers making the point less explicitly are Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Ideologies of
Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate:
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district judge threw a diversity case back to state courts).243 However, the
dissent in Thermtron (and the Carnegie-Mellon dissent) favored individual
plaintiffs suing corporations in their choice of fora-hardly consistent with the
usual view of ideological conservatives.2"
The model does not fare much better when applied to Thermtron's
progeny in the lower federal courts. At virtually every opportunity, many of
the lower courts chose to expand Thermtron and create additional exceptions
to Section 1447(d). The underlying ideology here is more difficult to discern.
It seems odd that in an era of burgeoning appellate caseloads, these courts
would take steps to increase that docket.24 Perhaps the judges were
motivated to reach the underlying issues on appeal-to enforce a forum
selection clause, as in Pelleport (in favor of the plaintiff), or uphold the
constitutionality of a federal jurisdictional statute, as in In re TM, (to the
detriment of plaintiffs). Whatever else might be said about these cases, hard
political ideology does not seem to be the central driving force. Intuitively,
it seems better to conclude that political ideology (consciously or not) plays
some role, though not necessarily the dominant one ascribed to it, in judicial
decisionmaking.'
In a more general sense, "ideology" might be said to be highly explanato-
ry of these cases, if we mean by that term the personal preferences of the
justices and judges involved. It goes without saying that judges bring their
own conception of judging to the task of statutory interpretation, as they do
with much else in life. By the same token, most judges strive in drafting
opinions to reconcile their preferences with standard legal references, such as
statutory text and judicial precedent.247 Under this view, Thermtron and its
progeny constitute a relatively unexceptionable case study in the impact of
ideology. Congress establishes a seemingly unambiguous rule, and federal
243. E.g., Braun, supra note 15, at 80 nA.
244. David L. Shapiro, Mr. JusticeRehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293,
294 (1976); Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct
Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 464, 467 (1992).
245. An oddity pointed out in Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co., 940
F.2d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1991) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
246. Political scientists have long tested ideological influences by (among other things)
correlating surrogates for ideology (such as the political party of the judge or the appointing
authority) with patterns of voting in cases. There is some evidence of such correlation at the
Supreme Court level, though other factors (like old-fashioned respect for precedent) are often
equally explanatory. Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 323 (1992). In the lower federal courts, studies have
shown ideology playing even less of a role. E.g., Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc
Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29,44-48 (1988); Donald 1. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party
and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 1955-1986, 44 W. POL.
Q. 317, 330 (1991).
247. Solimine, supra note 247, at 50; Zeppos, supra note 83, at 1120-29.
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judges find various exceptions to the rule justified on the basis of dynamic
statutory interpretation. At some point (as I have argued), these exceptions
have almost swallowed the rule. This progression (or regression) of a rule,
its exceptions, and the swallowing of the rule by the exceptions occurs in
common law and statutory analysis."4 A straightforward doctrinal analysis
of this trend is not irrelevant to the jurisprudence of federal courts, or indeed
to the impact of ideology on federal courts doctrine.
Having discounted the sweeping ideological indictment of federal courts'
doctrine does not mean that doctrine is coherent. Indeed, I have argued that
Thermtron was wrongly decided and, even if not, has been unjustifiably
expanded by the lower federal courts. But to criticize doctrine is not to
condemn it. None of the decisions were beyond the pale, in my view.249
To vigorously analyze, criticize and disagree with the rationale in court
opinions does not always, or even often, mean that doctrinal development
plays no role or a very limited one in judicial decision-making.
So, at least in most cases over the long term, doctrine does count, even
in the law of federal jurisdiction. The doctrine interpreting Section 1447(d)
is largely unsatisfactory, as it departs without good reason from the relatively
clear meaning of the bar to appellate review found in that statute. Nonethe-
less, there are also good reasons for the results of most of these cases, since
remand orders should not be carved out as an exception from appellate review.
Repealing or significantly modifying Section 1447(d) would have the twin
virtues of leading to that result, while bringing to an end an unsatisfactory line
of doctrinal analysis.
248. Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 871 (1991).
249. Cf POSNER, supra note 60, at 205 (decision is "principled" and not "result-oriented"
if "the ground of decision can be stated truthfully in a form the judge could publicly avow
without inviting virtually universal condemnation by professional opinion.').
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